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Wireless sensor networks which form part of the core for the Internet of Things consist of 
resource-constrained sensors that are usually powered by batteries. Therefore, careful 
energy awareness is essential when working with these devices.  
Indeed, the introduction of security techniques such as authentication and encryption, to 
ensure confidentiality and integrity of data, can place higher energy load on the sensors. 
However, the absence of security protection could give room for energy-drain attacks such as 
denial-of-sleep attacks which have a higher negative impact on the life span (availability) of 
the sensors than the presence of security features.  
This thesis, therefore, focuses on tackling denial-of-sleep attacks from two perspectives – A 
security perspective and an energy-efficiency perspective. The security perspective involves 
evaluating and ranking a number of security-based techniques to curbing denial-of-sleep 
attacks. The energy-efficiency perspective, on the other hand, involves exploring duty-cycling 
and simulating three Media Access Control (MAC) protocols – Sensor-MAC, Timeout-MAC and 
TunableMAC – under different network sizes and measuring different parameters such as the 
Received Signal Strength (RSSI) and Link Quality Indicator (LQI), Transmit power, throughput 
and energy-efficiency. Duty cycling happens to be one of the major techniques for conserving 
energy in wireless sensor networks and this research aims to answer questions with regards 
to the effect of duty cycles on the energy efficiency as well as the throughput of three duty-
cycle protocols – Sensor-MAC (SMAC), Timeout-MAC (TMAC) and TunableMAC, in addition to 
creating a novel MAC protocol that is also more resilient to denial-of-sleep attacks than 
existing protocols. 
The main contributions to knowledge from this thesis are the developed framework used for 
evaluation of existing denial-of-sleep attack solutions and the algorithms which fuel the other 
contribution to knowledge – a newly developed protocol tested on the Castalia Simulator on 
the OMNET++ platform. The new protocol has been compared with existing protocols and 
has been found to have significant improvement in energy efficiency and also better resilience 
to denial-of-sleep attacks. Part of this research has been published - Two conference 
publications in IEEE Explore and one workshop paper.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 





This chapter begins with a background context - Internet of Things, and then goes on to 
emphasize on its enormous potential based on statistics on the predicted growth of the IoT 
as well as its potential application areas. The chapter then becomes more specific as emphasis 
is placed on the core component of the IoT – a sensor. The sensors can communicate via a 
wireless sensor network which forms the basis upon which a problem statement is built. 
After the problem statement, research aim and objectives are highlighted. This is followed by 








About a decade ago, who would have thought that a car, wristwatch, refrigerator or even 
non-electronic objects would be on the internet? In the past, one would think of the internet 
as a network of just personal computers, mini-computers, super computers, mainframes and 
maybe mobile phones, at most. However, this is no longer the case. An animal can be part of 
the internet, simply by placing a sensor on its body with which its location can be tracked. A 
car can now be on the internet and its owner can start the car from their mobile phone and 
even control the heating of the car. With a smart watch, the owner can also check the fuel 
level of the car. This new concept of having everything on the internet with the ability to 
communicate with other devices is called the internet of things.  
The term “Internet-of-things” was devised by Kelvin Ashton who defined it this way: “The 
‘Internet of Things ’means sensors connected to the Internet and behaving in an Internet-like 
way by making open, ad hoc connections, sharing data freely and allowing unexpected 
applications, so computers can understand the world around them and become humanity’s 
nervous system.” In [60] it is defined as “…the network of physical objects that contain 
embedded technology to communicate and sense or interact with their internal states or the 
external environment.” The IoT, in my definition, could be seen as the inter-connection of a 
wide variety of computing/electronic devices for the purpose of sensing, propagating and 
processing of data in order to increase productivity for humans.  The internet-of-things 
therefore creates a more accommodating platform for fields like robotics and artificial 
intelligence. 
Growth Statistics 
The internet-of-things (IoT), also regarded as the internet-of-everything or the smart internet, 
is gradually gaining more grounds. This is evidenced by a 2014 report from Accenture which 
reveals that nearly two-thirds of consumers plan to own a wearable device by 2015. As at 
2014, research showed that seven percent of consumers owned a wearable device, while 4 
percent owned an in-home IoT device and that this figures weren’t higher mainly because of 
lack of awareness by the public that these devices existed [51] With regards to the future, the 
internet of things is predicted to be widely adopted by 2019 based on current trends which 
reveals that half of retailers are currently applying it to their businesses. Among the many 
uses of the IoT, 72% of business are involved in in-order, controlling building temperatures 
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and lighting, remote monitoring and indoor-location based services [54] Indoor-location 
based services which involves tracking shoppers ’paths inside stores happens to be a new 
industry with a predicted growth of up to $23 billion by 2021 [55]. 
 
IoT Application Areas 
To better understand what the IoT is all about, it is pertinent to look closely at the application 
areas of the IoT asides from the few mentioned earlier. Predicting 20 billion devices to be on 
the internet by 2020, [56] categorize the application areas for the IoT into 12 sections named 
as follows: 
Smart Cities. This involves using the IoT to automate the infrastructure in a city. This could 
range from roads cars and traffic to lighting and waste management. Smart parking, for 
example, can enable the monitoring of parking spaces availability thereby making it easy for 
cars to smartly locate parking spaces. The structural health of bridges can be monitored using 
sensors thereby preventing any collapse. In areas where bars and night clubs are plenty, the 
noise levels can be monitored in real time. Highways can become intelligent by displaying 
warning messages that relate to climate conditions, accidents and traffic jams. IoT can also 
be used in management of waste by monitoring the rubbish levels in waste bins in order to 
enhance trash collection. Smart lighting which is currently applicable in modern cars can also 
be applied to street lights allowing them to adapt their brightness to the weather conditions. 
IoT can help road users to avoid traffic congestions by suggesting alternative routes based on 
intelligence derived from monitoring vehicle and pedestrian levels. The presence of devices 
such as smartphones can be detected in an environment using IoT.  
Smart Environment. IoT can be applied to the environment focusing on aspects to do with 
environmental disasters such as forest fires, air pollution, earthquake detection, landslide 
prevention and snow level monitoring. 
Smart Water. The quality of tap water can be monitored using IoT. Factories can produce 
wastes or could have leaking pipes laid under water which could pollute rivers. IoT sensors 
can detect such leakages and wastes. Swimming pool conditions can be controlled remotely 
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using IoT. Water levels in rivers, dams and reservoirs can also be monitored using IoT to 
prevent flooding. 
Smart Metering. This involves the smart grid where energy consumption is monitored and 
managed. Performance in solar energy plants can also be monitored and optimized. 
Security and Emergencies. IoT can also be applied to security to track criminals and prevent 
them from going beyond a certain area. 
Retail. In retail, goods can be protected using sensors which could trigger an alarm if a 
customer attempts to steal a product. 
Logistics. IoT can be used for logistics with regards to the tracking of goods as they are being 
moved between locations. 
Industrial control. In industries, air quality can be monitored for oxygen levels as well as the 
detection of toxic gas in order to ensure that workers and other assets are safe. The location 
of assets can also be tracked using active and passive tags such as Zigbee and RFID/NFC 
respectively. In food factories, during the drying meat process, ozone levels can be monitored 
and managed. The temperature of industrial and medical fridges can also be controlled and 
managed. 
Smart Agriculture. In agriculture, quality of wine produced from grapes can be enhanced by 
monitoring the moisture of the soil in order to control the amount of sugar in the grapes. 
Micro-climate conditions can also be managed in order to enhance the quality of fruits and 
vegetables. Weather conditions can also be studies to forecast rain, drought or snow and 
these could be very helpful for farmers. 
Smart Animal Farming. Animals in the wild can be tracked by those who monitor their 
movements for the purpose of research. Animal offspring need certain environmental 
conditions to survive. IoT can be used to monitor and manage such environments to ensure 
the health and survival of the offspring. 
Domestic and home automation. Intrusion detection systems can be implemented using 
motion sensors for example which can then alert the authorities or the home owner in the 
case of any breach. 
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eHealth. IoT can also be applied in hospitals and to elderly and disabled people. Sensors can 
be used to monitor conditions of patients both inside and outside the hospital. The ultraviolet 
radiation of the sun could also be monitored in order to inform people when to avoid being 
exposed. For elderly or disabled people who live alone, the IoT can also be used for fall 
detection. It is also useful for monitoring vital signs in sportsmen in order to enhance their 
performance. 
1.2. Sensors 
Basically, all of the aforementioned categories have their semantics underpinned by a device 
called a sensor. Just like humans have five senses (smell, touch, sight, hearing and taste) 
which helps them to sense their environment and take action, so also are there different kinds 
of sensors which sense different properties in the environment and then use such information 
to enhance productivity in some way. Examples of sensors include temperature sensors, 
motion sensors, light sensors, proximity sensors, etc. A proximity sensor, for example, will be 
applicable for use on driverless cars to enable them avoid obstacles or collision of any kind. 
Sensors, in order to cover a wide area of the environment, are usually installed in large 
numbers and made to talk to each other. This interconnection between the sensors is called 
a sensor network. Initially, the connection medium between these sensors was wired but that 
wouldn’t allow for mobility and ease of installation. Hence, the need arose for a wireless 
sensor network (WSN). WSNs form a major part of the architecture of the IoT mainly for the 
sensing and propagation of data. The part of the sensor used for data propagation is usually 
called the actuator.  
The Internet of Things forms the macro-domain for which this project is based. The internet-
of-things is an emerging trend which is predicted to rapidly expand in the nearest future. In 
the simplest terms, the IoT represents the concept of having literally anything as part of the 
internet. While the current internet is somewhat limited to the conventional computers such 
as desktop computers, laptops, tablets and mobile phones, the IoT would consist of sensor-
based devices thereby allowing for any device with a sensor to be connected to the internet. 
While the internet consists of human-to-machine communication, the IOT includes machine-
to-machine communication as these devices may need to talk to each other in certain 
contexts. This then makes IoT applicable to many sectors such as agriculture, medicine, 
manufacturing, education, transport and many other sectors. 
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If, practically, any device can be connected to the internet, then a number of challenges exist 
such as that of interoperability, scalability, security, performance, intelligence, energy-
efficiency etc. This research narrows the focus to three of these concerns: Energy-efficiency, 
autonomy and security. More emphasis is placed on the relationship between them rather 
than considering each of them individually, although a relationship cannot be established 
without first understanding the individual components. While security focuses on the 
confidentiality, integrity and integrity of information on the IoT, energy-efficiency would 
focus on ensuring that the presence of security does not pose a threat to the energy 
consumption of the devices on the IoT considering their resource-constrained nature. 
Autonomy on the other hand, takes into consideration the complexity of the IoT and 
introduces some form of intelligence in handling security. The challenge then lies in how 
security can be made intelligent while ensuring energy-efficiency. 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model of intended research 
The above figure conceptualizes the entire research in the context of the IoT. The arrows 
depict the main focus of the research, being security; but then security is not considered 
singularly. By considering security in the context of the IoT, the problem of complexity then 
arises which could be handled through autonomy. Furthermore, the problem of resource-
constrained devices on the IoT, such as that of wireless sensor networks then arises thereby 
creating the need for energy-efficiency all for the purpose of enhancing security on the IoT. 
The novelty of this research lies in the multi-disciplinary approach to security on the internet 
of things by combining energy-efficiency and autonomy to enhance the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information on the IoT. 
The Internet-of-things (IoT) is predicted to expand exponentially in the subsequent years to 
come in terms of the number of inter-connected devices. With its application in sectors such 
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as the medical, transport, industry and other aspects of everyday life, the need for security 
becomes of top priority as these safety and time-critical systems are vulnerable to attacks 
because of the wide attack surface of any system that makes use if the internet. 
1.3. Wireless Sensor Networks 
One of the major components of the IoT is a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) which consists 
of resource-constrained sensor nodes that usually sense different types of data from the 
environment and then transmit to a base station. Because of their resource-constrained 
nature, they are very prone to certain attacks called denial-of-sleep attacks. 
Denial-of-sleep attacks are considered to be one of the most dangerous attacks which can 
reduce the life span of sensors from years to days [65]. Sensors usually go into sleep mode as 
a way of conserving energy. These attacks work by keeping the nodes awake and preventing 
them from going into sleep mode thereby draining the energy of the nodes [67]. 
Various methods are used to carry out a denial-of-sleep attack. These are commonly 
classified as sleep deprivation, barrage, synchronization, replay, collision and broadcast attacks 
[68]. These attacks take advantage of vulnerabilities such as frame collisions, message 
overhearing and idle listening [66]. On the other hand, various approaches have been 
proposed to detect and prevent denial-of-sleep attacks. Existing comparisons of these 
approaches are qualitative in nature with a focus on their strengths and weaknesses [68]. 
Wireless sensor networks which form part of the core of the Internet of things consists of 
resource constrained sensors that are usually powered by batteries. Hence, there is need for 
energy-awareness when working with these devices. The presence, as well as the absence of 
security can have negative effects on energy consumption of these sensors. While the 
introduction of security techniques such as authentication and encryption in order to ensure 
confidentiality, integrity of data could place more load on the sensors, the absence of security 
could also give room for energy-drain attacks such as denial-of-sleep attacks which has a 
higher negative impact on the life span (availability) of the sensors than the presence of 
security techniques. 
With regards to energy-efficiency, the MAC layer plays a very important role in the 
consumption of energy. Existing MAC protocols use various approaches such as CSMA, 
collision avoidance and adaptive duty cycling to achieve energy-efficiency, however majority 
of these protocols do not consider mobility of the sensors. Hence, the information with which 
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these protocols work is usually pre-defined before the start of the network with the 
assumption that the network nodes are static. With recent applications of the WSNs such as 
driverless cars where mobility is a major part, these existing protocols may not be suitable for 
such scenarios. 
1.4. Problem Statement 
Sensors are battery-powered and usually have a limited lifetime as well as a limited memory 
and processing capacities. This then implies that energy-consumption is a major challenge in 
wireless sensor networks. In [74] emphasis is placed on the fact that energy-efficiency would 
have to be increased in order to meet the exascale computing speeds of the future. The radio 
in a sensor plays a huge role in energy consumption and it is responsible for transmitting, 
receiving and listening for signals. Unlike a wired network were the medium is end-to-end, 
the wireless sensor network using a shared wireless medium and this means that one node 
can overhear signals meant for other nodes. There could also be collision between signals 
leading to loss of data and consequently loss of energy in retransmitting this data. Even when 
a sensor is not transmitting nor receiving, it could lose energy from listening for activity on 
the network. Control packets overhead are also another source of energy loss. All of these 
sources of energy loss have been tackled with solutions like CSMA, adaptive duty cycling, 
collision avoidance, time-division multiplexing, frequency division multiplexing and code-
division multiplexing. In time-division multiplexing, each sensor node is assigned a time slot 
for which it can transmit data. Hence, two sensors cannot transmit at the same time thereby 
preventing any form of collisions. In frequency-division multiplexing, different frequencies are 
assigned to different nodes, hence two nodes can communicate at the same time but on 
different frequencies which prevents any form of interference. Code division multiplexing 
uses spread spectrum to allow multiple access to the same channel. However, most of these 
solutions were not designed with the mobility of sensors and topological changes in mind. 
Sensor mobility is becoming more popular in application areas such as underwater 
surveillance where sensors can move underwater to detect debris; driverless cars whereby 
sensors on a moving vehicle transmit data about their environment to the cloud. Mobility of 
sensors would always lead to frequent changes in topology thereby requiring solutions that 
are not just traffic-adaptive but topology-adaptive. One example of an application of mobile 
wireless sensor networks is animal monitoring where sensors are attached to animals to track 
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their migration patterns. Considering that the animals are mobile, these changes the position 
of the sensors hence requiring changes to aspects like routing of data. 
Asides energy-consumption in WSNs, an equally important aspect to be aware of is the fact 
that the more IoT is adopted, the more vulnerable systems and people on the internet 
become. Considering that, the internet was not designed with security in mind, it is therefore 
plausible to combine energy efficiency and security and they tend to overlap and care has to 
be taken not to implement one at the expense of the other. Security can only expand with 
energy-efficiency. In other words, the more energy-efficient a WSN is, the more the chances 
of introducing stronger security techniques. Information security can be viewed in the context 
of confidentiality, integrity and availability. The availability aspect which involves ensuring 
that information is accessible to authorised users as at when they need it. Availability overlaps 
with energy-efficiency in that if a sensor is not energy-efficient, then a sensor can quickly 
exhaust its lifetime thereby making information unavailable for its intended purpose. 
1.5. Research Aim 
The main aim of this project is to improve the energy-efficiency and security of a wireless 
sensor network with focus on the MAC layer, in a way that creates a balance between energy-
efficiency and security 
1.6. Research Objectives 
• To investigate the relevance of the MAC layer with regards to energy-efficiency in a 
wireless sensor network 
• To evaluate existing energy-efficient MAC layer protocols using simulation 
experiments 
• To compare and evaluate existing solutions to tackling denial-of-sleep attacks 
• To explore how a balance can be established between energy-efficiency and security 
in WSNs 
• To arrive at a framework/tool for tackling denial-of-sleep attacks 
• To develop an energy-efficient prototype/protocol for tackling denial-of-sleep attacks 
• To test the developed prototype under denial-of-sleep attacks in comparison with 
other existing protocols 
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1.7. Contributions to Knowledge 
• One of the main contributions to knowledge was the framework developed as part 
of the novel MAC layer prototype. The framework served as a basis for the 
development of algorithms to improve on the energy-efficiency of the wireless 
sensors by incorporating a layered model which applies virtual clustering, RSSI/LQI 
measurements, adaptive duty cycling and cluster head rotation.  
• Another contribution to knowledge is the development of the novel MAC protocol 
which was based on the algorithms. The algorithms and the protocol were 
implemented on OMNET++ simulator, on top of the Castalia framework for WSNs. 
Aspects of the algorithm tested include the energy efficiency and throughput. The 
protocol was tested against other existing MAC layer protocols (SMAC and TMAC). 
The results showed the new MAC protocol showed about twice as much reception at 
the sink node than the two existing protocols with the same amount of energy. The 
algorithm was also tested under denial-of-sleep attacks in comparison with other 
protocols and showed the same level of energy-efficiency. 
 
1.8. Research Methodology 
Simulation and real-device experiments were the main approaches used in this project. More 
specifically, the methodology for this research included the following stages: 
• Evaluate existing solutions to denial-of-sleep attacks. This stage involved carrying out an 
extensive review of the literature to identify existing solutions to denial-of-sleep attacks. 
This included techniques, approaches, frameworks, models and protocols. 
• Development and Application of GAS (Green Autonomous Security) model as a high-level 
approach to tackling denial-of-sleep attacks.  
• Use OMNET++ and Castalia to observe effects of various parameters such as duty-cycling, 
sample interval, transmit power on energy-efficiency on existing protocols. This stage 
involved investigating the energy consumption of SMAC and TMAC under different network 
conditions. 
• Use OMNET++ and Castalia to do a performance analysis by observing  parameters such as 
RSSI/LQI and the effect on throughput. This stage involves measuring the performance of 
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SMAC and TMAC which included not just energy consumption measurements but 
throughput measurements. 
• Use insight from the simulation results as well as evaluation to propose an approach for 
tackling denial-of-sleep attacks. Based on the results from the simulations as well as the 
evaluation of existing solutions, a layered model was developed.  
• Develop a MAC layer protocol based on the proposed approach and test this protocol 
against existing protocols e.g. SMAC and TMAC. The aforementioned layered model was 
then used as an input into the development of the algorithms as part of the MAC-layer 
protocol (Layered-MAC). 
• Test the MAC layer protocol by comparing it with existing MAC protocols based on energy-

























Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
“Creativity is knowing how to hide your sources” 
Albert Einstein 
 
This chapter begins with an introduction to the MAC layer and the role it plays in a wireless 
sensor network. The MAC layer is also discussed in terms of the role it plays in energy 
consumption and the various sources of energy loss are discussed. MAC protocols have then 
been classified based on whether they allow multiple access to a medium or not. Mobility of 
the sensors was also considered in terms of the impact on energy consumption. Beyond the 
MAC layer and its protocols, other solutions to do with security, autonomy and energy-
efficiency are considered. 
Most of the below literature was taken from [58] and gives an overview of the wireless 
sensor networks and the MAC layer in particular. 
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2.1. Relevance of the MAC layer 
Wireless network mediums are always shared by all the nodes in that network and hence 
require some form of access control to the medium. The shared medium gives rise to noise 
and interference, multiple nodes accessing the medium at the same time, fading of signals 
and unidirectional links.  
• Noise 
• Interference 
• Simultaneous medium access 
• Signal Fading 
• Unidirectional Links 
The MAC layer plays a role in the reliability and efficiency of transmissions on the WSN. In 
other words, the function of the MAC layer is to resolve any conflicts that may arise when a 
node is about to send data on the shared medium alongside other competing nodes. It can 
correct errors in communication and is also responsible for flow control, framing and 
addressing. The MAC layer is part of the OSI model which categorises a network into layers. 
The MAC layer is the 2nd layer directly on top of the physical layer. It is a sub-layer of the 
data-link layer which has the logical link control layer as its other sub-layer. 
 
Figure 2: OSI Reference Model 
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Figure 2: OSI Reference Model 
 
2.2. Sources of energy loss 
The MAC layer is also important aspect of wireless sensor networks when energy-efficiency 
is the main concern. To enhance energy-efficiency, it is important to know the sources of 
energy loss in WSNs. These include: 
• Transmission and reception of data. Nodes lose energy while transmitting data either 
as a unicast or a broadcast. The same goes for receiving data from another node. 
• Idle listening. When nodes are neither transmitting nor receiving, they could still be 
listening for activity in preparation to either receive or transmit data. This listening 
especially when it is idle also drains energy 
• Collisions leading to data retransmissions. Packets being transmitted at the same 
time by two or more nodes may collide thereby leading to loss of data. The data will 
then need to be retransmitted thereby leading to energy loss. 
• Packet overheads. The size of the packet could still be an overhead and still cause 
some energy loss, depending on the amount of data being transmitted. 
• Control Packet transmissions. Control packets are different from data packets and 
contain meta-data and can be used as beacons to wake-up sleeping nodes, for 
synchronization of time across nodes and for extra information about the network. 
The more information contained in the control packets, the more energy required to 
transmit these control packets alongside the data packets. 
• Transmit power levels. Radios have transmit power levels which have an effect on 
the throughput of the network. The higher the transmit power level, the more 
energy is consumed. Sometimes the transmit power level can be higher than what is 




2.3. Classification of MAC protocols 
MAC protocols are classified based on how they control access to the medium. The categories 
are as follows: 
2.3.1. Contention-free protocols 
These set of protocols ensure that only one node can access the medium at a time. Therefore, 
a node would have to reserve a slot exclusively for its transmission. The slots can either be 
fixed for all nodes at the start or they could be assigned on-demand. Contention-free 
protocols are further classified into Fixed and dynamic assignment classes. 
Fixed Assignment Classes 
These are classes that prevent collisions by setting fixed reservation slots for all nodes before-
hand. Below are three techniques used by fixed assignment classes: 
• Time division. Each node is assigned a time-frame. A time-frame consists of a fixed 
number of transmission slots. The disadvantage of this is that, if slots are of fixed sizes, 
then very large packets may not be delivered leading to reduced throughput. On the 
other hand, very small packets would use only a little of the time frame thereby 
leading to increased latency. If there’s a change in network topology, then the slots 
need to be reassigned. 
• Frequency Division. In this class, the frequency band is broken down into smaller 
frequency bands. Nodes that could interfere with other nodes are made to use 
different frequency bands thereby preventing interference. 
• Code Division. In this class, multiple access is possible but without collision because 
of nodes allowed to use different codes. It there is an interference due to same 
frequency of nodes, these can be corrected at the receiving node using forward error 
correction through the use of the codes. 
Dynamic Assignment Classes 
Unlike fixed assignment classes which are rigid in nature as they are not able to adapt to 
topological changes, dynamic assignment classes only assign slots when they are needed. 
Below are three techniques used  
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• Polling. In polling, a base station is responsible for asking each node if they have any 
data to send. The base station moves to the next node if the previous node doesn’t 
have any data to send. 
• Token-passing. Although token-passing is similar to polling, the main difference is that 
in polling, there’s a centralised way of checking whether a node has data to send, 
whereas in token-passing the nodes make poll request to each other using frames 
called tokens which are passed to each other in a round-robin fashion. A node is able 
to transfer data when it has the token. 
• Reservation-Based. In this class, static time slots are used to reserve future access for 
nodes to access based on demand. Although the slots are static, they are only reserved 
on demand. This reservation is done by toggling a reservation bit. 
Below are examples of contention-free MAC layer protocols which use one or more of the 
aforementioned techniques from either fixed or dynamic assignment classes: 
• TRAMA. This protocol uses a distributed election scheme which is based on traffic 
information to determine when nodes can transmit. The benefit of this is that slots 
are not assigned to nodes without traffic thereby increasing throughput. 
Furthermore, nodes can also be aware of when they can become idle thereby allowing 
them to sleep. 
• Y-MAC. This protocol uses TDMA-based medium access. Time is divided into frames 
and slots and each frame contains both a broadcast period and a unicast period. 
Synchronous low-power listening is used by the nodes and the contention during 
broadcasts is resolved through random back-off times and preambles. 
• DESYNC-TDMA. Based on TDMA, this protocol uses a self-organising 
desynchronization algorithm. It improves on TDMA by not using a global clock and is 
also traffic-adaptive. The desynchronization process ensures that tasks are distributed 
evenly among sensors. 
• LEACH. This is a combination of TDMA with a clustering algorithm. One benefit of the 
clustering algorithm is that it enhances data aggregation and also reduces the amount 
of data sent to the base station for processing. LEACH consists of two phases: Setup 
 26 
phase and steady-state phase. In the set-up phase, the cluster heads are selected and 
the cluster head role is distributed among the sensors to ensure that the energy-usage 
is distributed evenly among the sensors. If new sensors join the network, they decide 
which cluster to join based on their received signal strength indicator (RSSI). The 
steady-state phase is the phase where the sensor can communicate only with its 
cluster head. One of the setbacks of leach is that it makes an assumption that all nodes 
have access to the base station and this is not always the case especially when the 
network gets larger. Even though clustering can improve energy-efficiency, more 
energy could still be wasted if a cluster head is far from the base station. 
• LMAC. In this protocol, slots are not assigned centrally but rather assigned by the 
nodes themselves using a distributed algorithm.  One of the downsides is that it is 
possible for more than one node to select the same slot which can lead to collisions. 
One variation of the LMAC protocol is the mobile LMAC which goes further to support 
mobile wireless sensor networks where nodes can frequently join and leave the radio 
range of other nodes. The MLMAC adapts to changes in the topology of the network. 
Another downside of both LMAC and MLMAC is that they both create fixed slot sizes 
which can lead to inefficiency in bandwidth usage. 
2.3.2. Contention-based protocols 
Unlike contention-free protocols were collision is prevented because there is no chance of 
collisions because there is no contention among nodes, contention-based protocols allow 
nodes to access the medium simultaneously, although with a mechanism for reducing 
collisions or recovering from them. Below are examples of contention-based protocols. 
• ALOHA. If a broadcast is made by a node, ALOHA uses acknowledgments to confirm 
that the broadcast transmission was successful. Collisions are addressed through 
exponential back off. This is a form of algorithm that allows some level of delay in 
transmission of data packets to avoid collisions. A slightly better version of ALOHA 
called the slotted-ALOHA requires time synchronisation among the nodes as the 
nodes have to only transmit data at predefined points in time. 
• Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA). CSMA has two variations: CSMA with collision 
avoidance (CSMA/CA) and CSMA with collision detection (CSMA/CD). In the case of 
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the latter, the node doesn’t immediately transmit data, it senses the medium to check 
whether it is idle of busy. If the medium is busy, it backs off; else it begins 
transmission. However, the hidden terminal problem can lead to collisions at the 
receiver which the sender won’t detect. This hidden terminal problem is not detected 
by this technique, however, CSMA/CA avoids collisions by sensing the medium just 
like in the case of collision detection but then it goes further not to transmit even 
when the medium is idle. Rather it waits for a period of time called DCF inter-frame 
space (DIFS) in addition to a random back-off value. This could lower the chances of 
collisions from the hidden terminal problem but does not completely eliminate it. 
• Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (MACA). This is achieved through request-
to-send (RTS) and Clear-to-send messages (CTS) whereby a node sends an RTS 
message to the receiving node. If the node responds with a CTS message, then the 
sender can transmit data. This addresses the hidden terminal problem. 
• Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance for Wireless LANs (MACAW). In this 
protocol, an acknowledgement (ACK) control message is sent once a packet has been 
received correctly. Apart from the CTS and RTS, a data sending (DS) message is also 
sent to also help with collision avoidance. 
• Power Aware Multi-Access with Signalling. Reducing energy consumption caused by 
overhearing is the major focus of this protocol. PAMAS is similar to the MACA protocol 
in that it uses RTS and CTS messages. It also uses two separate channels for 
transmission to avoid collisions. To achieve the use of separate channels, two radios 
have to be used which then leads to increase in energy consumption. 
• SMAC. SMAC is a duty-cycle based MAC protocol which has a fixed listen interval. One 
of the disadvantages of this is that of there is very low traffic the energy is wasted 
during the listen phase. On the other hand, if there is very high traffic, throughput 
may be hindered as the listen time may not be enough. Therefore there is a need to 
have an adaptive listen time which TMAC provides. Another challenge with SMAC is 
that the duty cycle parameters are decided in advance and this may not be suitable 
for networks with rapidly changing topologies. Another challenge is that it does not 
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have random offset and therefore there may be collisions during broadcasts and 
RTS/CTS does not work for broadcasts. 
• TMAC. This protocol has two major strong areas. One of them is the adaptive listening 
interval which adapts the listen interval according to the traffic level. Another strong 
point is the future-request-to-send technique which addresses the early sleeping 
problem. However, TMAC in order to conserve energy sends messages between small 
periods of time and this may have an effect on throughput in high traffic-load 
networks. 
• Pattern MAC. Similar to T-MAC, sleep schedules are adapted based on the traffic of 
the node and its neighbours. PMAC uses patterns to describe sleep and wake times 
of nodes. While this helps save energy by putting nodes to sleep when there is no 
activity, this pattern is usually shared with other nodes during a period called the 
Pattern Exchange Time Frame. During this exchange of patterns, collisions are likely 
to occur.  
• Routing-Enhanced MAC. This focuses on improving end-to-end latency and also 
reduces energy through duty cycles. For a node to send data to a destination node, 
the data has to pass through other nodes on a rout to get to its destination. RMAC 
aligns the sleep and wake periods based on this route. 
• Data Gathering MAC. This protocol is focused in the fact that most WSNs use a tree-
like communication pattern. Therefore, its goal is to deliver data along this tree with 
very low latency and high energy-efficiency. 
• Preamble Sampling and WiseMAC. WiseMAC protocols focuses on communications 
from a base station to a sensor. It uses a technique called preamble sampling where 
on one hand a node first sends a preamble as a form of alert to the receiver before 
actually transferring the original message. On the other hand, all nodes sample the 
medium by listening to the channel for as long as the channel is busy. The nodes only 
sleeps only when the channel is idle or a data frame is received. The benefit of this is 
that it enhances throughput as no node is likely to miss their packet due to sleeping 
at wrong times. A downside is the size of the preamble could still have a negative 
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effect on throughput and devices that are not intended receivers are still kept awake 
thereby affecting energy-efficiency negatively. 
• Receiver-Initiated MAC. In this protocol, a transmission is always initiated by the 
receiver of the data. The receiving node broadcasts a beacon message if the medium 
is idle. The purpose of the beacon message is to create awareness of its readiness to 
receive data. A node which has information to send then transmits the information 
the moment it receives a beacon message from its intended receiver. The beacon 
message sent by the receiver also contains some extra information useful for handling 
any issues to do with multiple senders contending to send a message to the receiver. 
While this has an advantage on the receiver end by reducing overhearing, the 
overhearing seems to be increased on the sender side thereby increasing energy 
costs. 
2.3.3. Hybrid Protocols 
These are protocols have the characteristics of both fixed and dynamic assignment classes. 
• Zebra MAC. This uses combination of CSMA and TDMA approach for low-traffic and 
high-traffic scenarios respectively. ZMAC has a setup phase which allows a node to 
find its neighbours and obtain its slot in the TDMA frame. The slots are assigned based 
on information about the node’s 1-hop and 2-hop neighbours thereby ensuring that 
two nodes within a 2 hop neighbourhood cannot have the same slots. Z-MAC is also 
flexible enough to allow nodes to set the length of their time slots. While this protocol 
may be efficient in preventing collisions, a lot of energy is spent during the setup 
phase. 
• Mobility Adaptive Hybrid MAC. This protocol takes mobility into consideration by 
combining the TDMA-style slots with mobile slots. The mobility of the sensor is 
detected through the RSSI of the node. Mobility information has to also be distributed 
to neighbours through a mobility beacon. MHMAC is better than LMAC in that one 
node can have more than one clot in a frame thereby increasing bandwidth and 
reducing latency. 
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2.4. Mobile Wireless Sensor Network Applications 
Most of the research in WSN’s focus on the static WSNs where the nodes are not mobile. 
Such research solutions may not be suitable for mobile WSN’s and therefore would need to 
be improved. Before delving deeper into mobile WSNs, it is important to be aware of the 
existing application areas for mobile WSNs.  The following are application areas for which 
mobile WSNs can be applied: 
• Underwater monitoring. This involves deploying sensors on ocean beds to detect 
debris from plane crashes 
• Small-scale robot squads. This involves deploying coordinated robots to search for 
earthquake victims under a rubble for example. 
• Tracking sensors. Sensors can be attached to humans or equipment to monitor their 
location. 
• Wearable sensors for independent assisted living. Wearable sensors can be part of 
eHealth systems which can help in assisting elderly people. 
 
2.4.1. How mobility can enhance energy-efficiency 
A certain problem called the sink’s neighbours problem is discussed in [57] which is a 
problem that occurs with nodes which are closest to the sink. These nodes are usually the 
first to die in a network because they always relay information from the sensors to the sink 
and vice versa. Hence, their energy drains away faster than other nodes. By making the 
nodes mobile, especially the sink and relay nodes, then the energy usage can be distributed 
evenly among the sensor nodes. Ahmad et al (2014) introduce a way of conserving energy in 
mobile WSNs through load-based allocation and time allocation leister techniques.       
2.5. Other Energy-related solutions 
ICT accounts for about 2.5 percent of all harmful emissions with regards to global carbon 
emissions. Two aspects are highlighted that contribute to energy saving: Reliability and 
Efficiency [1]. From a CIA perspective, while efficiency has to do with availability, reliability 
has to do with integrity. 
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IoT Communication is identified as one of the areas that dominates energy consumption 
and efficiency can be enhanced by reducing transmission power to the barest minimum, 
applying the right algorithms to design communication protocols and activity scheduling [2]. 
Prasad and Kumar[1] also suggest that redundancy technologies could be very helpful in 
handling reliability issues which could be present not only during transmission, as in the 
case of efficiency, but also during sensing and processing by IoT sensor nodes. 
Asides reliability and efficiency, security is another variable that has to be considered when 
making a trade-off as an energy-efficient and reliable IoT would not be termed as successful 
if there is no security[3].   
 
 
Figure 3: Security Mechanisms for M2M communication [8] 
The above figure shows two mechanisms: Early detecting node compromise with couple and 
bandwidth cooperative authentication to filter false data.  
The first mechanism works by coupling nodes together either in Husband(H) and Wife (W) 
mode or husband (H)-Wife(W)-Child(C) mode and having them exchange beacon messages 
 32 
that could help them detect a compromise on one of the nodes[3]. While this enhances 
security, more energy is being utilized. The case could also be vice versa, where energy-
efficiency is enhanced and security becomes compromised like in the case where a node is 
compromised by an attacker without being detected because the node has been put in 
sleep mode to save energy. 
The second mechanism is a bandwidth co-operative authentication that involves a collective 
authentication by a number of nodes is proven to be very effective[4], however, on the 
condition that the transmission radius is well chosen as the en route filtering probability 
reduces as transmission radius increases[3]. 
Tourancheau et al[5] conclude based on their experiments that the energy cost is relatively 
low for sensor devices in a wireless sensor network although this is restricted to IEEE 
802.15.4 security features and does not take other aspects of security into consideration. 
The question then lies in how a balance can be ensured between efficiency, reliability and 
security. 
2.6. Security 
2.6.1. Autonomous Access control 
One of the challenges identified for self-configurable IoT systems is energy awareness. 
Considering the envisioned scale of IoT growth of about 20 billion devices in 2020[6], it is 
worthwhile to consider energy as a constraint when building self-configurable systems as 
this could be help improve the life-span of sensor devices as well as provide more support 
for critical applications[7]. Other challenges identified include development of suitable 
metrics, coordinated contextual intelligence, resilience to failures, outrages and attacks, 
application integration and incentives for self-management. 
In [8], an identity authentication and capability-based access control model (IACAC) is 
proposed and is said to protect against man-in-the-middle, replay and denial of service 
attacks. Certain criteria are considered to be very important in the context of the IoT when 
developing authentication and access control models. These include mutual authentication, 
lightweight solution, attack resistance (Denial of service, Man in the middles, Replay 
attacks), Distributed nature and access control. The IACAC model achieves all of the 
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aforementioned criteria except the lightweight criteria which is synonymous with energy 
efficiency. 
2.6.2. Device based authentication  
The IBM Zone Trusted Information Channel (ZTIC)[9] is a specialised hardware device 
intended to protect against certain man-in-the-middle attacks through malicious software  
that cannot be prevented by two-factor authentication approach. 
 
Figure 4: ZTIC Architecture[9] 
The above figure shows how the ZTIC technology works by creating a secure connection to 
the bank server through a proxy on the USB device. This means that all communication 
between the ZTIC proxy and the server is outside of the client PC and is protected via end-
to-end TLS connection. 
2.6.3. Quantum-cryptography based authentication 
Based on quantum cryptography, a quantum-secure authentication is proposed in [10] as 
having the following characteristics: 
• A key that cannot be physically emulated 
• Secure against digital emulation attacks 
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• Is not dependent on secret data 
• Is not dependent on unproven mathematical assumptions 
• Its implementation is straightforward 
The benefit of quantum cryptography is that, unlike digital keys where their theft can go 
undetected, a physical object (physical unclonable function) which is based on quantum-
physical principles makes it impossible for an attacker to typify the incident light pulse 
which in turn prevents the attacker from being able to mimic the expected optical response. 
2.6.4. Authorization 
In [11], an OAUth-based authorization service (OAS) architecture, which is targeted at 
machine-to-machine applications (IoT), is proposed. The open-authorization is beneficial in 
that it is third-party in nature; hence reducing the load on the resource-constrained devices 
on the IoT, allowing for scalability and remote customization of access policies. 
However, one of the setbacks of the OAS architecture is that its energy consumption is on 
the high side particularly due to the radio transmission. 
On the other hand, in [12], a secure and efficient authentication and authorization 
architecture is proposed which reduces communication overhead by 26% and 
communication latency by 16% by using a smart gateway to ensure a distributed form of 
authentication and authorization based on the certificate-based DTLS handshake protocol. 
2.6.5. Smart Object Lifecycle-based access control 
It is important to consider security in the context of the smart “thing” and ensure that 
security is addressed at each phase of the lifecycle from when power is first introduced to 
when the device is in operation, thereby making security fundamental to the device’s 
proper functioning rather than just being an add-on[13].  
In [14], certain attacks are classified based on what phase of the lifecycle they happen. At 
the initial stage, a compromise of root of trust can occur as well as modification of 
credentials and keys at the manufacturing phase. At the deployment phase, server 
impersonation and denial-of-service attacks could occur while physical capture of devices 
could occur at the operational phase. 
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2.6.6. Threats, Vulnerabilities and Solutions to the IoT from a CIA perspective 
According to E&Y [15], 7 in 10 devices on the IoT are vulnerable. They emphasize on the 
idea that the cyber threat to the IoT should not be seen just as a technological issue but as a 
business-wide issue. Hence, the figure below illustrates the 8 facets which constitute the 
entire risk landscape with regards to cyber threat on the IoT. 
Figure 5: Risk Landscape for IoT [1] 
Information security can practically not be discussed without putting the CIA 
(confidentiality, security and availability into perspective). The literature is discussed with a 
risk assessment approach in mind which is quantitatively calculated by multiplying the 
threats, vulnerabilities and assets.  
Thus, in carrying out a proper risk assessment, one needs to understand not only the threats 
and vulnerabilities involved but also the assets being compromised, with information being 
the asset in this context. 
Kumar and Lee [16] discuss possible threats to the IoT with specific considerations to the 
healthcare application domain. Although the threats are discussed in a healthcare domain 
context, these threats can still be applied to other domains as pointed out by other 
researchers [17]. A number of threats have been identified as follows: 
Monitoring and Eavesdropping 
Kumar and Lee [16]describe this as the most common threat to patient privacy. From a CIA 




distinction between data ownership and data control/access illustrating that the owner of 
the data may not necessarily be the only one with access to the information using Google as 
an example who may use another individual's data for their predictive analysis in the case of 
Google Trends; which poses a huge challenge. 
Denial-of-Service attacks 
Roman et al. [19]; Alsaadi and Tubaishat [18] discuss on denial-of-service attacks with more 
emphasis on distributed-DOS attacks perpetrated through the use of botnets. With regards 
to the CIA, this mainly affects the availability of information. 
Energy Drain Attacks 
In [20], emphasis is placed on wireless sensor networks are being the target for energy-drain 
attacks because of their resource-constrained nature of the sensor nodes. Considering that 
these energy-drain attacks take advantage of the MAC layer, different MAC layer 
implementations are considered such as Sensor MAC, Timeout MAC, Berkeley MAC and 
Gateway MAC. 
2.6.7. IoT architectures and their security implications 
There are different IoT architectures and the architecture adopted determines the kind of 
security vulnerabilities that could be exploited which in turn determines what kind of 
solutions that should be in place. 
It is also important to look at access control in the context of the cloud as the centralized IoT 
architectures include the cloud. Security as a Service (SecaaS) is a relatively new approach 
which stems from the need to outsource security services as well as the need for Managed 
Security Service providers to have a centralized security service from the cloud[21]. 
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Figure 6: Protocol Architecture[22] 
The above figure shows the architecture of an IoT protocol. On the rightmost part are the 
protocols responsible for the connectivity of the IoT device and this is similar to the Open 
Systems Interconnect (OSI) Model but has some slight differences. While the OSI model has 
7 layers, this model has 6 layers. The lowest three layers stay the same for both models 
(Network, Link and Physical layer). An ID layer is present and is unique to the IOT protocol 
architecture and is not found in the OSI model and is intended for identification of IoT 
resources. 
Both quantitative and qualitative methods are used for the evaluation. One of the 
quantitative methods used for the evaluation is a weighted scoring model. One of the benefits 
of this method is that it is easy to present and understand however it has its down sides. One 
of the downsides is that the values assigned to the solutions are mostly subjective. Hence, if 
this same method were to be used by someone else, the results might be totally different. 
This therefore had to be combined with some simulations were necessary. Simulations were 
used to validate some of the solutions that had their simulation models available. The use of 
simulations were also limited as not all solutions had the models that could be simulated. 
2.7. Denial-of-Sleep Attacks 
Denial of sleep attacks are mentioned in [20] as one the major attacks that could be targeted 
towards sensors due to their inherently limited energy sources. They conclude that battery-
drain attacks could have negative impacts on the node life span as well as network capability. 
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More specifically, these attacks include a sleep-deprivation attacks whereby a node is 
prevented from entering into sleep mode thereby reducing its life span.  
2.7.1. State-of-the-art 
In [23], denial-of-sleep attacks are classified based on the attack strategy used and these 
includes sleep deprivation, barrage attack, synchronization attack, replay attacks and 
broadcast attacks. 
Existing Defences for Denial-of-Sleep attacks 






The solutions above show that GMAC has the highest network lifetime thereby saving 
the most energy through the technique of centralized cluster management. One of 
the reasons for this is that, unlike the other protocols in which all nodes first receive 
a message before authentication, G-MAC only receives the message through one 
gateway node, which then authenticates the packet before sending it to the gateway 
node. This technique does a better job than the other protocols in guarding against 
broadcast denial-of-service attacks[24]. The 802.11 WLAN uses a MAC protocol called 
Distributed Coordinated Function which was also tested and found to have lowest 
network lifetime of 6 days because of its 100% duty cycle hence, lifetime stays the 
same across all scenarios. 802.11 is used for devices not as resource-constrained as 
wireless sensor networks, hence energy-efficiency is not given a high priority. While 
GMAC may have outperformed the other protocols, it does not take other network 
metrics such as throughput and packet delivery ratio into consideration. Therefore, 
while it may have a high-network lifetime under attack, there is no evidence of how 
much throughput/packet delivery is achieved. 
 
Figure 7: MAC Protocol Performance Results [24] 
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- Hash-based scheme                                                                                                                            
The hash-based scheme proposed by Pirretti et al in [25] was an improvement of the 
initial round robin scheme they developed which in turn was an improvement of the 
random vote scheme. The hash-based scheme is intended to protect against barrage 
attacks and sleep deprivation attacks. This scheme overcomes the lack of scalability 
problem as well as the overhead present in the previous schemes. However, the hash-
scheme only protects against intrusion directed at cluster heads. 
- Clustered Adaptive Rate Limiting 
Raymond and Midkiff [26], on the other hand, suggest the Clustered adaptive rate 
limiting (CARL) technique which unlike the conventional intrusion detection 
mechanisms is lightweight in nature and works by classifying incoming packets as 
either legitimate or malicious based on whether they pass authentication and anti-
replay checks or not. 
- Threshold-based defence scheme (synchronization attack) 
In [27], a threshold-based defence scheme is proposed which works by using an 
expected clock drift threshold to ignore any SYN messages with a relative time to sleep 
that is larger than the clock drift threshold. 
- Fake schedule switch scheme 
In [28] Chen et al propose a security scheme which works with the aid of the Received 
signal strength indicator (RSSI) in protecting specifically against collision, exhaustion 
and broadcast attacks and even jamming attacks. However, this solution is not energy-
efficient and network throughput is also negatively affected. 
- Four-component Defensive framework 
As a way of preventing denial of sleep attacks, in [29] a defensive framework is 
proposed which is made of four components: 
• Strong link-layer authentication 
While [29] suggest that the authentication at higher protocol layers such as the 
link layer provide integrity and confidentiality, [23] propose a mechanism that 
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not only considers availability through its cross-layer approach (physical and 
link layer) but is also energy efficient. 
• Anti-replay protection 
Clustered Anti-replay Protection (CARP) is suggested to be an energy-efficient 
technique which not only uses anti-replay messages at the data link layer but 
also takes advantage of the network-layer neighbor information which 
restricts the neighbor information maintained by a node thereby saving 
energy. 
• Jamming identification and mitigation 
In [30], a jam detection technique is proposed based on signal strength and 
location consistency checks. 
• Broadcast attack defense 
A light-weight intrusion detection technique is suggested which operates at 
the physical layer by classifying each packet based on whether it has passed 
the authentication and anti-replay checks. 
- Distributed wakeup scheduling scheme  
One of the ways through which power can be drained is through data collection from 
sensors. In [31], a scheme is proposed that helps nodes to periodically switch between 
sleep mode and active mode. They do this in a way that not only saves energy but also 
maintains network latency.  
- Secure wake-up scheme 
In [32], Falk proposes a secure wake-up scheme which verifies that pending messages 
are authenticated and legitimate without the node having to change to an active state. 
- Two Phase Security System 
In [33], Zhao and Nygard propose a two-phase security system which makes use of 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods and a Tabu Search technique to track and search 
for intruders respectively. 
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- AMC Model for Denial-of-sleep detection 
In [34], Bhatassali and Chaki propose a mathematical model based on Absorbing 
Markov Chain (AMC) whereby the considered expected death time of a sensor 
network is used to determine whether there is a denial-of-sleep attack or not. 
- Hierarchical Collaborative model 
In [35] a hierarchical framework is proposed which uses anomaly detection technique 
to detect denial-of-sleep attacks. This method takes throughput into consideration by 
distributing the workload among components thereby increasing the energy-
efficiency of the method. 
- Cross-layer energy efficient security mechanism 
In [23], Boubiche and Bilami propose a mechanism that takes advantage of the 
network, MAC and physical layers of the OSI model, hence the reason why it is cross-
layer. This mechanism protects against six attacks (Sleep deprivation, barrage, 
synchronization, replay, collision and broadcast attacks). They achieve this by using 
the routing information at the MAC layer in combination with the Received Signal 
Strength Indicator (RSSI) which helps prevent replay attacks. The mechanism is 
designed to work with the SMAC protocol. 
- Isolation of low-energy nodes 
In [36], Kaur and Ataullah propose a secure method that involves setting the detection 
mode for in sleep schedule and isolating the nodes with lower energy from attacks. 
- Anomaly-based Defense Algorithm 
In [37], a defence mechanism is proposed which forces nodes to enter into a deep 
sleep mode when any anomalies are detected. While this algorithm seems to defend 
against denial of sleep attacks, a challenge of reduced network throughput exists due 
to the fact that nodes are in deep sleep mode and cannot transfer information. 
- Two-tier Energy-efficient secure scheme 
In [38], Hsueh et al proposes a two-tier secure transmission scheme which uses a hash-
chain to ensure energy conservation, low complexity, mutual authentication, 
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symmetric encryption, dynamic session key generation and counter the replay attack 
and forge attack while integrating with the MAC protocol (XMAC). 
- Selective Authentication 
In [39], Goudar and Kulkarni propose a selective authentication process which makes 
use of a selected number of nodes as firewalls through bootstrapping to prevent 
attacker nodes from successfully broadcasting their messages. This scheme focuses 
more on protecting against broadcast attacks. The selective authentication process is 
preceded by two steps: network organization and identification of malicious nodes. 
- Zero Knowledge Protocol 
In [40] the zero knowledge protocol is proposed for authenticating the sensor nodes 
that try to alter the sleep schedule of the nodes. This protocol used in combination 
with the interlock protocol for key transfer is aimed at tackling man-in-the-middle and 
replay attacks. 
Compared to the conventional wired and wireless networks (IEEE 802.3 and IEEE 802.11), 
wireless sensor networks have less mature defences against malicious attacks because of the 
constraints applied in keeping the hardware simple enough to reduce cost and also increase 
durability. Sensor nodes, because of their energy-constrained nature, are usually put to sleep 
when they are idle. A denial-of-sleep attack is capable of depriving a sensor from sleep mode 
and thereby draining its energy sources [41]. 
In the quest to find ways to prevent denial-of-sleep attacks, it is important to identify and 
analyse the vulnerabilities that could be exploited by these attacks. Three vulnerabilities are 
identified by [41] and they include: Frame collisions, Message overhearing and idle listening.  
Frame collisions which occur as a result of interference of one frame by another frame can 
lead to data loss which demands resending of the message thereby causing loss of energy. By 
jamming, and attacker can cause collision between frames and drain energy from the sensors 
in the process of retransmission. The solution to this is usually contention-based backoff 
algorithms. Message overhearing, although used in networks that are not energy-
constrained, is not ideal for wireless sensor networks because it involves the participation of 
all the nodes in receiving a message that was intended for one node only. The solution to this 
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is usually early rejection and message passing. Idle listening occurs when a node is idle and 
listens for traffic, which consumes more energy than when it is receiving data. An attacker 
can take advantage of a node’s idle time between transmission periods. 
In addition to the three vulnerabilities mentioned above, [29] includes Control packet 
overhead whereby control packets which are usually meant to be received by all nodes are 
exploited by an attacker and sent to all nodes thereby draining their energy. 
A few reviews have been done with regards to denial-of-sleep defence mechanisms. In [42], 
Vinodsharma while comparing denial-of-sleep solutions mentions only six solutions. 
Mahalakshmi and Subathra in their survey [43] of 11 solutions conclude that the solutions are 
unrealistic because they require large scale alterations.  
2.7.2. Research approach 
The methodology for this research is experimental in nature but first begins with a review of 
state-of-the-art proposed solutions regarding energy-efficiency in wireless sensor networks 
as well as a review of state-of-the-art solutions regarding security in wireless sensor networks. 
This then follows with an evaluation of these solutions in order to find the pros and cons of 
these solutions and then find gaps that can be filled. 
Systematic Review of state-of-the-art energy-efficiency solutions for WSN 
• Latency-Throughput-Network Lifetime 
Latency is the measure of the delay in transmitting a packet from one point to another. 
It can be measured either one way (time taken from source to destination) or round-
trip (time taken from source to destination and back to source).  Throughput is how 
much of information is transferred from one point to another within a given time 
period. Hence, it is measured in bits/sec. Network lifetime is very important for WSNs 
as the nodes have a limited lifetime. Network lifetime is the time between when a 
WSN is put to use and when one of the nodes fail. Although these three 
aforementioned parameters do not measure energy, they are closely connected with 
energy efficiency and contribute to the overall performance of a network. The 
relationship energy-efficiency and these parameters will be analyzed in order to 
establish a trade-off between them all.  
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• OSI/TCP-IP layer of operation 
Similar to security, energy-efficiency can be applied at various layers of the network 
model. Most solutions focus on the MAC layer mainly because access to the radio is 
managed by this layer and the radio is known to be one the highest consumers of 
energy on the WSN. 
 
Systematic Review of state-of-the-art security solutions for WSN 
• Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability (CIA) 
This has to do with what aspect of information is being protected. Confidentiality 
involves privacy of information and not allowing an unauthorised user to have access 
to the information. Integrity has to do with maintaining the correctness of data while 
it is stationary or in transit. Availability has to do with ensuring that data is available 
for use by authorised users at the time they want it. 
• Preventive-Detective 
Some security techniques could be preventive in that, when they are implemented, 
they prevent an attack from being successful. On the other hand, some security 
techniques could be detective in nature, in that they do not prevent an attack but 
could detect an attack and notify the owner of the information. Other security 
techniques could play both roles. 
• OSI/TCP-IP layer of operation 
The older OSI model is logical model of how data moves from one node to the other 
on a network and consists of 7 layers namely Application layer, Presentation layer, 
Session layer, Network layer, Transport layer, Data link layer and Physical layer. The 
TCP/IP mode is a newer model than OSI and consists of four layers which are more 
like a compression of the 7 layers of the OSI model into 4. The four layers include 
application layer, transport, internet layer and network interface layer. Most security 
protocols operate on one or more of these layers and such information is necessary 
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as this helps further understand the semantics and effectiveness of the technique or 
protocol. 
• WSN Attacks type handled by security solution 
Most security techniques are aimed at curbing at least one type of attack or threat, be 
it preventive or detective. It is important to know what attacks have solutions and 
what attacks don’t. For the attacks that have solutions, it is also important to know 





   




The above figure highlights the main focus of this research as well as the energy-efficiency 
and security properties that would be looked into. 
 
Figure 9: Conceptual model for proposed research 


























Figure 8: Research Focus and Context 
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The above figure is a conceptual model which also shows the direction of the research. It 
begins with an investigation into energy efficiency and how this can be achieved using some 
form of autonomy which may involve self-configuration and self-adaptation. By improving 
the energy-efficiency, more room is then left to introduce security solutions that are also 
energy-efficient. This then gives rise to the term GAS (Green Autonomous Security) which 
forms the blueprint for this research. 
The methodology is divided into three parts:   
• Qualitative Analysis 
• Ranking using Weighted Scoring Model 
• Simulation using OMNET++ and Castalia 
 
2.7.3. Qualitative Analysis 
The first part is a qualitative analysis of a number denial-of-sleep defence techniques. This 
analysis is based on a set of criteria:  
- Chronology 
The solutions were discussed in a chronological manner beginning from the earliest to 
the latest. 
- Protocols 
Most of the solutions are either associated with existing protocols or are even 
protocols themselves, like in the case of the GMAC protocol 
- Level of autonomy 
With the increasing vulnerabilities as well as attacks strategies that could be used to 
carry out energy-drain attacks (in this case, denial-of-sleep attacks), it is important to 
introduce autonomy or intelligence into the solutions being proposed. One way to 
identify the level of autonomy in a solution is by looking at the assumptions made 
while developing the solutions. If the assumptions phase out certain vulnerabilities, 
then the solution is likely to be low on its level of autonomy. 
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- Effect on network lifetime (energy-efficiency) 
The network lifetime is a strong indicator of how energy-efficient a solution is, 
because it has to do with how long a sensor can stay alive on its batteries before they 
run out. Energy efficiency is classified in terms of high and low. With high signifying 
that energy-efficiency has been considered to a great extent and vice versa. 
- Attacks which are defended against 
Most of the solutions are targeted towards certain attacks, meaning that some 
solutions may not be able to prevent all forms of denial-of sleep attacks. 
2.7.4. Ranking using weighted scoring model 
The second part of the methodology consists of using a multi-criteria decision making method 
(weighted scoring model) to give scores to these techniques based on a set of criteria. Asides 
the weighted scoring model, other similar models were also considered before a choice was 
made. Two of these models include the Best-Worst Method (BWM)[44] and the evidential 
reasoning approach[45]. A weighted scoring model seemed to be simpler than the other 
methods. Considering that the reason for the ranking of the techniques wasn’t to choose a 
technique to implement but rather to establish a gap or baseline for further research, it was 
not necessary to go for a complex decision making method. Hence, the weighted scoring 
model was chosen. 
The third part involves a simulation using OMNET++ and Castalia framework. 
2.7.5. Simulation using OMNET++ and Castalia 
The WSN MAC protocols had to be evaluated based on their performance. Certain metrics 
had to be used and these metrics include: 
Latency: This has to do with any form of delay that happens during communication in the 
wireless sensor network. Latency is measured in units of time e.g. seconds 
Throughput: As mentioned earlier, this has to do with the amount of data successfully 
transferred from the source to destination within a given period of time. The unit for 
throughput is bits/second. However in the simulator, this is referred to as the transmitted 
packets per time it took to transmit those packets. 
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Consumed energy: This is the total amount of energy used to transmit data from a source to 
its destination. The unit for consumed energy is joules/bit. 
Network Lifetime: This is how long the nodes on a network can stay alive from the point when 
they start working to the point where the nodes fail. 
Tunable MAC Parameters 
- Duty cycle 
A node can either be listening for any transmissions or sleeping. Considering that 
nodes consume a lot of energy while listening, the duty cycle is one of the most 
important parameters as it plays a major role in reducing the listening time of nodes. 
The duty cycle is expressed as a percentage or fraction of time for which the node 
listens or for which the node is active in duty. For example, if the duty cycle is 20% or 
0.2, this means that the node listens for 20% of the time during its cycle of listen and 
sleep. For Castalia the duty cycle is expressed as a floating point value (double). 
- Listen interval 
It’s important to understand that there’s a difference between the duty cycle and 
listen interval. While duty cycle is a fraction of time the node listens, listen interval is 
the actual time for which the node listens. With the duty cycle and the listen interval, 
the sleep interval can then be calculated. The listen interval has an effect on both 
throughput and latency. If the listen interval is small, then the sleep interval will also 
be small and this can lead to minimised latency as the delay is reduced because of the 
small intervals. On the other hand, if the listen interval is too small, then throughput 
may be reduced meaning that packets may not deliver completely and the node may 
transition into sleep mode before the packets finish delivering. The listen interval is 
an integer and is measured in milliseconds. 
- Beacon Interval Fraction 
The presence of a duty cycle means that a node that wants to transmit to sleeping 
nodes needs to wake up those nodes. This can be done using beacons as a form of 
preamble before sending the actual message. The beacon interval fraction is the 
fraction of the sleep interval for which the beacons will be sent. The higher the 
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fraction, the more energy is consumed. This parameter also has a great impact on 
energy consumption. The beacon interval fraction is also expressed with the double 
data type between 0.0 and 1.0. 
- Probability of transmissions 
This is used alongside the number of transmissions or retransmissions to calculate the 
expected number of successful transmissions per node. It works by assigning a 
number between 0 and 1 as a probability of transmission. Probability of transmissions 
is expressed as a double value in the simulator. 
- Number of transmissions 
This has to do with the number of times data is transmitted. The more transmissions, 
the more energy consumed. With more transmissions, better performance is 
guaranteed. On the other hand, the lesser the number of transmissions, the lesser the 
energy consumed but performance may also be reduced as data may not reach all the 
required nodes. Number of transmissions is expressed as an integer value. 
- Random Transmission Offset 
This is the random time for which a node delays before information is transmitted. 
This delay is a random value which ranges from 0 (which is the default value) to the 
transmission offset. The aim of the transmission offset is to avoid collisions by 
ensuring that two or more nodes do not broadcast as the same time. This is stored 
with an integer data type in the simulator. 
- Retransmission Interval: This is the interval between transmissions and is also 
expressed as an integer data type. 
- Backoff Type: This has to do with carrier sensing. 
- Backoff Base value 
- CSMA Persistence 
- Transmit all packets in free channel 
- Sleep during backoff 
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TunableMAC Limitations 
- No security to prevent denial-of-sleep attacks as a nodes can be kept awake through 
a stream of beacons 
- Does not support unicast 
Still this leads to a waste of energy as information is always sent to all neighbouring 
nodes. 
- Does not support RTS/CTS: Therefore there is no form of collision avoidance 
After getting the results from the simulations the next step is to then find a gap in the current 
solutions that can be improved on. The simulator will then be used to run different 
experiments trying out different parameters to see which best fills the gap. This gap could be 
a gap in energy-efficiency or security. 
Mobility of the sensors is not explicitly considered in this research because it broadens the 
score of the project and requires a lot of detailed testing which could be another research 
area on its own. It has therefore been identified as one of the areas of future consideration. 
Although part of the outputs of this research may favor mobility, no explicit tests are carried 
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In this chapter a framework [73] is proposed for intelligent agents (sensors) on a Wireless 
Sensor Network to guard against energy-drain attacks in an energy-efficient and autonomous 
manner. This is intended to be achieved via an energy-harvested Wireless Sensor Network 
using a novel architecture to propagate knowledge to other sensors based on automated 
reasoning from an attacked sensor. The proposed framework is based on comparisons of 
existing energy and security-based approaches, a weighted score model ranking and 
simulation-based review of TunableMAC protocol. 
 Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) form part of the architecture of the Internet of Things (IoT) 
and are known particularly for their resource-constrained nature due to the fact that these 
sensors are usually powered by batteries alongside their low processing power. This makes 
the WSN prone to energy-drain attacks, one of which is known as denial-of-sleep attack [61]. 
A number of approaches exists which aim to tackle these attacks; however these approaches 
rarely take into consideration the future scale of the IoT as predicted to expand exponentially 
in the coming years [62]. The implication of this is that approaches would need to be, not just 
energy-efficient but, autonomous in nature in order to withstand the variety of attacks that 
may arise as a result of a larger network where there is a wider attack surface. 
3.2. Comparisons and Simulation for Security Based solutions 
In order to arrive at a proposed approach, comparisons of existing approaches have been 
done as well as simulations involving some of the existing protocols. The results from the 
comparisons and simulations have fed into the proposed approach.  
Technique Year Protocol 
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2012 Nil Low 
Uses leaf nodes 
which can be 
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2013 SMAC Low 
Limited to the 
SMAC protocol 






2015 XMAC Medium 
Uses hash chain 
















Figure 10: Qualitative analysis of Denial of Sleep defence techniques 
One of the findings is that a number of solutions are topology specific and attack- strategy 
specific. This means that some of the solutions cannot cater for all kinds of topologies and 
also cannot mitigate or prevent all kinds of denial-of-sleep attacks. Furthermore, some 
techniques are also protocol specific. 
3.2.1. Ranking using Weighted Scoring Model 
To use the weighted scoring model, the following formula is required: 
 
Where  
wj = relative weight of the criterion 
aij= performance value of altenative Ai 
m = number of alternatives 




Figure 11: Ranking of Denial-of-Sleep Defence techniques based on WSM scores 
Figure 11 shows the final weighted scores assigned to the techniques and the graphical 
representation of these scores. Four criteria have been used for the WSM: Energy-
efficiency, level of autonomy, effect on throughput and attack focus. 
 Among the ten approaches, the hash-based scheme and the hierarchical collaborative model 
had the highest ranking based on the weighted scoring model with a score of 72 with energy 
efficiency being its strong point while the fake schedule switch scheme was the lowest at 52 
with its weak point being the network throughput. The next best (CARL) is relatively lower on 
throughput due to its distribution of workload among components but at par with the hash-
based scheme on its energy efficiency. 
The weightings assigned to the approaches are based on a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative data about the approaches from their authors and other authors ’reviews, as 
well as the researcher’s point of view.  
The results show how the approaches rank rather than just stating their strengths and 
weaknesses. Security frameworks are not included as part of the ten approaches compared 
because, unlike techniques, frameworks focus on the ‘what ’rather than the ‘how ’of the 
approach. Hence, the decision criteria used is limited to techniques and does not include 
frameworks. 
The reason for the ranking is not to choose a technique to be applied but to understand the 
status quo of existing research so as to pinpoint where improvement can be made. Hence, a 
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simple multi-criteria decision making method is used. If the goal were to make a choice from 
the ten approaches to be applied to a given scenario, then a more advanced MCDM model 
would need to be used that allows for an extended decision criteria. 
These findings are intended to fuel further research into how best to ensure an energy-
efficient and autonomic security of the Internet of things. 
3.2.2. Wireless Sensor Network Simulation for TunableMAC protocol 
This simulation involves 16 temperature sensors arranged in the form of a grid. These sensors 
sample their temperature readings when it gets above 15 degrees. Any node that senses a 
value above the threshold then broadcasts this value. The value propagation which records 
how many of the nodes received the broadcasted value is then recorded for each node. 
Energy consumed by the node is also recorded as well as the number of packets transmitted 
by the nodes. In this scenario, only one node senses temperature beyond 15 degrees. The 
results are dependent on a number of parameters associated with the Tunable MAC protocol 
used in the scenario. The parameters include duty cycle, beacon interval fraction, and TX 
Power. 
 Duty Cycle Beacon Interval 
Fraction 
TX Power 
1 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5, 0.8 1.0 0dBm 
2 0.1 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5, 0.8 0dBm 
3 0.1 1.0 -15, -10, -5, -1, 0 
 
 
Varying Duty Cycle 
Application: got value – yes/no 
Duty Cycle=0.02 Duty Cycle=0.05 Duty Cycle=0.1 Duty Cycle=0.5 Duty Cycle=0.8 





Figure 12: Effect of duty cycle on Value propagation 
The above graph in Figure 12 shows the value propagation which indicates how many of the 
nodes received the propagated value as the duty cycle is varied. Each time a sensor senses a 
temperature above 15 degrees, it broadcasts a value. The average value of number of nodes 
that received the value is known as the value propagation. Value propagation is shown on the 
y-axis while the different duty cycles are shown on the x-axis. The significance of figure 12 is 
that more understanding about the relationship between duty cycles and their impact on 
value propagation can be seen.  One point to note is that the change in value propagation is 
not linear and this is due to the variations and randomness in the start times of the nodes 
(lack of synchronisation of sleep cycles). In [46], one of the ways to ensure synchronization of 
schedules is for each node to send a SYNC message to other nodes to make them aware of its 
schedule. The main irregularity lies between the second and third bar from the left, where 
the duty cycle is 0.05 and 0.1 respectively. However, the graph still shows at large that the 
value propagation reduces as duty cycle increases. The lowest value is 0.867 which happens 
when the duty cycle is at the highest relatively (0.8).  A duty cycle of 0.8 indicates that the 
node is listening for 80% of the time and sleeps for 20% of the time if it doesn’t have anything 
to transmit. 
Resource Manager: Consumed Energy 
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Duty Cycle=0.02 Duty Cycle=0.05 Duty Cycle=0.1 Duty Cycle=0.5 Duty Cycle=0.8 




Figure 13: Effect of duty cycle on Energy Consumption 
The above graph shows the effect of duty cycling on energy consumption. It is clear that 
energy consumption increases as the duty cycle increases meaning that the relatively highest 
consumed energy happens when duty cycle is 0.8. The more a node listens, the more energy 
it consumes. In [47], they conclude in their results and discussions that energy consumption 
increases as duty cycle increases. Among the three parameters (duty cycle, beacon interval 
faction and transmit power), the duty cycle relatively has the greatest impact on energy 
consumption with its highest being 0.557. 
Transmitted packets 
Duty Cycle=0.02 Duty Cycle=0.05 Duty Cycle=0.1 Duty Cycle=0.5 Duty Cycle=0.8 





Figure 14: Effect of duty cycle on Transmitted Packets 
The above graph shows the impact of the duty cycle on the transmitted packets. Apparently, 
the lower the duty cycle, the higher the transmitted packets. This is due to the fact that the 
node spends less time listening and therefore can send more data.  
Varying Beacon 














Figure 15: Effect of beacon fraction on value propagation 
The above graph shows the effect of the beacon interval fraction on the value propagation. 
Value propagation increases as the beacon fraction increases. This means that more nodes 
are likely to receive the propagated value when more beacons are sent. 














Figure 16: Effect of beacon fraction on consumed energy 
The above graph shows the impact of the beacon interval fraction on the consumed energy. 
















Figure 17: Effect of beacon interval fraction on transmitted packets 
The above graph shows the effect of varying the beacon interval fraction on the transmitted 
packets. The higher the beacon interval fraction, the higher the number of transmitted 
packets. 
The beacon interval fraction can be said to be directly proportional to the value propagation, 
consumed energy and transmitted packets. 
Varying TX Power 
Application: got value - yes/no 
TX Power=  
-15dBm 
TX Power =  
-10dBm 
TX Power =  
-5dBm 
TX Power =  
-1dBm 
TX Power = 
0dBm 





Figure 18: Effect of TX power on value propagation 
The above graph shows the effect of varied transmitted packet on the value propagation and 
it clearly indicates that the value propagation increases as the radio transmit power increases. 
The value propagation is at its highest (0.979) when transmit power is at its highest (0dBm). 
ResourceManager: Consumed Energy 
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Figure 19: Effect of TX power on energy consumption (Consumed energy in mJoules) 
The above graph shows the effect of the radio transmit power on the consumed energy. The 
simulator starts the y axis starts at 0.135 instead of 0. Hence, two of the bars with values of 
0.135 are not showing on bar chart as both bars are on the line. The energy increases as the 
transmit power increases. Hence, the reason why most radios for wireless sensor networks 
do not exceed 0dBm of transmit power. 
Transmitted Packets 
TX Power=  
-15dBm 
TX Power =  
-10dBm 
TX Power =  
-5dBm 
TX Power =  
-1dBm 
TX Power = 
0dBm 





Figure 20: Effect of TX power on transmitted packets 
The above graph shows the effect of varying the transmit power on the number of 
transmitted packets. It is evident that the higher the transmit power, the higher the packets 
transmitted. There’s a huge difference between the change in TX packets from 15dBm to -
10dBm and the change in TX packets from -10dBm to -5dBm. 
Transmit power can be said to be directly proportional to the value propagation, consumed 
energy and transmitted packets. 
3.2.3. Analysis and Discussion 
Part of the relevance of this research is that it becomes easier to understand the impact of 
certain parameters on various aspects of a wireless sensor network thereby giving more 
insight as to where to focus on in terms of increasing energy-efficiency.  
One important question that crops up is to find out which of the three parameters has the 
most impact on energy-efficiency assuming they have the same value propagation level. This 
then makes it easier to know which of the parameters to tune in order to increase energy-
efficiency with minimal effect on throughput which can be measured from the value 
propagation. 
Based on the above results, 117 packets are transferred with a duty cycle which consumes 
energy of 0.146. On the other hand, about 17 packets are transmitted with a beacon interval 
fraction which consumes 0.142. Finally about 23 packets are transmitted with a TX power 
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which consumes 0.143. This reveals that the duty cycle has more impact on energy efficiency 
considering the relatively huge amount of packets that were transmitted with relatively less 
energy, although latency was not taken into consideration in this analysis. 
If self-adaption and self-configuration has to be adopted into wireless sensor networks, then 
it is important to understand the effect of certain parameters on certain network 
performance metrics (latency, throughput, and energy-efficiency) so as to know what level of 
adaptation is required in certain circumstances. While parameters like transmit power are 
difficult be to change while the network is live [48], parameters like duty cycle and beacon 
interval fraction can be optimised at runtime as evidenced in [49][50]. 
Areas for further research 
Is there a more energy-efficient way to wake up sleeping nodes in order to transmit data to 
them, other than through beacons? 
Is there a way to tell that these beacons are genuine and are not a form of denial of sleep 
attack? 
How much impact would mobility have on the consumed energy of the sensors? 
How can an energy-efficient and self-adaptive protocol which considers sensor mobility and 
protects sensors from energy-drain attacks (denial-of-sleep attacks) be developed? 
3.3. Comparisons and Simulations for Energy-based approaches 
 
Just like humans have five senses that make them intelligent and able to sense their 
environments, wireless sensor networks are networks of sensing devices which can sense 
their environments for various properties such as heat, light, sound, etc. and distribute this 
information via the network, to other destinations thereby making systems smarter. Hence, 
these wireless sensor networks can play a huge role in larger smart networks such as the 
Internet-of-Things (IoT). Similarly, just like humans can have viruses attack their senses and 
prevent them from functioning or even shorten their lives, WSNs can experience certain 
kind of attacks that can also prevent these sensors from functioning, except that these 
attacks are intentional and launched by humans.  Because these sensors are mostly battery-
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powered, these attacks can even reduce network lifetime enormously. One of such attacks 
is the denial-of-sleep attack. 
Denial-of-sleep attack is a kind of denial-of-service attack which attacks the MAC layer of a 
WSN network and is considered to be one of the most dangerous attacks as it can reduce 
the life span of sensors rapidly[1]. Unlike jamming attacks whereby the attacker may use 
months to completely deplete the life of a sensor, with the denial-of-sleep attack, the 
attacker can achieve the same goal within few days[2]. Sensors usually go into sleep mode 
as a way of conserving energy. These attacks work by keeping the nodes awake and 
preventing them from going into sleep mode thereby draining the energy of the nodes[3]. 
Various methods are used to carry out a denial-of-sleep attack. These are commonly classified 
as sleep deprivation, barrage, synchronization, replay, collision and broadcast attacks[4]. 
These attacks take advantage of vulnerabilities such as frame collisions, message overhearing 
and idle listening[5]. On the other hand, various approaches have been proposed to detect 
and prevent denial-of-sleep attacks. Existing comparisons of these approaches are qualitative 
in nature with a focus on their strengths and weaknesses[4]. 
The aim of the research is to evaluate and review existing approaches to either preventing or 
reducing the impact of denial-of service attacks and rank them based on a set of criteria using 
a multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) method. A novel taxonomy is created which 
classifies the solutions into two groups: security-oriented approaches and energy-oriented 
approaches. This section, however, concentrates mainly on the energy-based approaches. 
Thus, a simulation experiment is carried out based on two of the existing energy-based 
protocols to monitor their effect on energy consumption as well as their effect on throughput. 
The section ends with a recommendation of a model for building an improved energy-aware 
protocol. 
3.3.1. Methodology for comparison and simulation 
Firstly, a taxonomy is proposed whereby existing approaches to tackling denial-of-sleep 
attacks are classified into two major groups (Security-oriented and Energy-oriented) because 
a denial-of-sleep attack threatens the energy of sensors by preventing them from sleeping. 
While the threat aspect calls for a security-oriented solution, the energy vulnerability calls for 
an energy-oriented solution. Therefore, the problem can be tackled either from a security 
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perspective or an energy-efficiency perspective. One justification for this classification is that 
it aligns with the GAS model discussed earlier. Existing approaches either directly aim to 
prevent the attacks from happening or indirectly reduce the impact of the attack by inherently 
saving energy where necessary to its barest minimum. 
Preventing attack using security approach. In general, protecting information would always 
involve one of the three aspects: Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. These approaches 
involve techniques that cover these three aspects with a major focus on availability. The 
security approaches are also further uniquely sub-categorised into five (5) groups based on 
their semantics and their advantages and disadvantages are then analysed. The categories 
are listed below as follows: 
- Cluster-based (GMAC, HBS) 
- Mathematical models (AMC) 
- Measurement-based (FSSS, HCM, CLM) 
- Authentication (CARL, SWS, ZKP) 
- Cryptographic-based (HBS, TSS, AntiDoS, One-time password scheme) 
Reducing impact using energy-aware approach. Asides from explicitly preventing the denial-
of-sleep attacks using the aforementioned security approaches, below are the energy-based 
approaches that could play a role in reducing the impact of a denial-of-sleep attack. The 
classifications below are done in [6] and are all MAC layer protocols. 
- Static scheduled protocols (SMAC) 
- Adaptive group schedule (TMAC) 
- Adaptive repeated schedule (SCP-MAC) 
- Adaptive staggered schedule (DMAC) 
- Adaptive reservation schedule (RMAC) 
Weighted Score Model Approach. The approaches are compared based on 2 criteria. It is 
important that the security approach is not implemented at the expense of energy 
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conservation and the network performance and some level of adaptation should be included 
in the approach so as to create an optimum performance. 
The criteria, therefore, include the throughput which has to do with how much information 
is transmitted from the sender to the receiver; and latency which has to do with delay (how 
long it takes for information to get delivered). 
A weighted scoring model (WSM), among other multi-criteria decision models such as Best-
worst method (BWM) and the evidential reasoning (ER) approach[7][8] was chosen to rank 
the proposed security techniques because of its simplicity.  
The model works by first assigning weights in percentage to the criteria based on their 
importance and then assigning weights to the approaches for each criteria. The weights for 
the approaches and then multiplied by the weights for the criteria then summed up. 
 
Where 
wj = relative weight of the criterion 
aij = performance value of alternative Ai 
m = number of alternatives 
n = number of decision criteria 
Simulation. The simulation is done using OMNET++ and Castalia and involves simulation of 
SMAC, TMAC which seem to be the most popular among the duty-cycle based protocols and 









A. Gateway MAC (GMAC). The Media Access Control (MAC) layer of the IEEE reference 
standard is usually exploited by denial-of-sleep attacks and the GMAC is a protocol developed 
to guard specifically against broadcast attacks[9]. GMAC saves a lot of energy via its 
centralised cluster management approach and has a better network lifetime than other 
protocols such as the SMAC, TMAC and BMAC. However, it is relatively low in terms of 
autonomy as it focuses on the MAC layer of the network. Here, there is high latency because 
of clusters. 
B. Hash-based scheme (HBS). The hash-based scheme protects against barrage attacks and 
works by protecting cluster heads against intrusion[10]. Similar to GMAC, it works by 
protecting the cluster heads against intrusion which is energy-efficient but not autonomous 
enough to guard against attacks to sensors other than the cluster heads. This also has high 
latency. 
C. Clustered Adaptive Rate Limiting (CARL). CARL classifies incoming packets based on 
authentication tests and anti-replay checks [3]. This is energy-efficient and relatively positive 
on throughput but has a relatively low autonomy because of its use of current host-based 
intrusion detection methods which do not take the distributed nature of sensors into 
consideration. If there is a high amount of traffic more than anticipated by the protection 
mechanism, then the rate limiting may go out of hand thereby even negatively affecting 
throughput. Low throughput is the case here. 
D. Fake schedule switch scheme (FSSS). The FSSS uses received signal strength indicator 
(RSSI) measurement aid in protecting against collision, exhaustion and broadcast attacks[11]. 
It works by increasing the energy usage of the attacker which may affect throughput if the 
fake schedule switch is not done accurately. Although there is some form of autonomy in this 
method, throughput remains at stake. 
E. AMC Model. Absorbing Markov Chain (AMC) is a mathematical model which is used in 
calculating the expected death time of a sensor network and using that to determine the 
presence of a denial-of-sleep attack[12]. While this may have some form of autonomy in its 
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approach, it may affect network throughput because of its procedural complexity and may 
sometimes not be energy-efficient. 
SNo  Year Category Advantages Disadvantages 
1 GMAC 2006 Cluster-based Centralised 
approach 
May not work 
well in very large 
networks 
2 HBS 2006 Cluster-
based/Cryptographic 








especially in the 
CARL technique 
4 FSSS 2009 Measurement-based  May have a 
negative impact 
on throughput 
5 AMC 2012 Mathematical 
models 




Other techniques include the secure wakeup scheme[13], zero knowledge protocol[14], cross 
layer mechanism[15] and  
3.3.2. Energy-based approaches 
1. SMAC(Static-scheduled)[16]. The SMAC protocol has a static schedule which is fixed 
during network setup. This means that nodes have a fixed duty cycle (sleep and listen 
durations are fixed). The implications of this is that in low traffic, energy may be 
wasted during the fixed listen durations whereby nodes will stay awake unnecessarily 
for the sake of completing the schedule, instead of sleeping. On the other hand, during 
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high traffic, the listen duration may not be enough thereby leading to increased 
latency. SMAC using techniques such as Request-to-send (RTS) and Clear-to-send 
(CTS) which helps with collision avoidance and acknowledge (ACK) to contend for the 
medium. It involves three phases: the first phase is the SYNC phase where nodes 
synchronise their schedules by choosing a schedule or following schedules from other 
neighbouring nodes. The second phase is the active period and the third phase is the 
sleep period. 
Algorithm for SMAC 
 Node listens to medium for a certain period (Carrier Sense) 
 If node receives schedule from neighbour, it chooses the schedule and becomes a 
follower  The node broadcasts its new schedule after a random delay 
 Else, the node determines its own schedule and broadcasts it to neighbours 
 Node sends message using RTS by randomly selecting a time slot 
 If a node hears an RTS or CTS message, it goes to sleep 
 
2. TMAC (Adaptive grouped schedule). Unlike SMAC where the duty cycle is fixed, the 
TMAC allows for flexibility during a node’s listen time according to the traffic density. 
The minimum time for which a node stays awake before going to sleep is the adaptive 
timeout (TA). Other packets used by TMAC include Data-send (DS) which is a dummy 
message sent when a node wants to transmit at the same time it hears a future RTS 
packet. This helps prevent collision by delaying transmission. 
 
Algorithm for TMAC 
Nodes wake up at the beginning of the slot 
Node sleeps if no activity is observed 
If a node overhears a CTS, it stays awake till the end of the transmission 
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At the end of the transmission, the node contends for the medium again and begins 
transmission if it wins the medium 
If a node has pending data, it can inform its intended receiver using a future-request-
to-send (future RTS) technique to avoid the early-sleeping problem 
The receiver remains active until the message is received 
If another node is about to make a transmission and overhears a future RTS packet, it 
sends DS to its receiver to delay transmission. 
3. SCP-MAC (Adaptive repeated schedule). This protocol improves the grouped 
schedule protocols by eliminating the early sleep problem by creating repeated small 
active periods in one slot. 
Algorithm for SCP-MAC 
Nodes performs carrier sense by randomly selecting a slot within the first contention 
window 
If channel is idle 
Sender transmits a short wake-up tone timed to intersect with the receiver’s 
channel polling 
After waking up the receiver, the sender transmits the data packet 
Else node aborts transmission until next frame 
4. DMAC (Adaptive Staggered Schedule). This works very well with the tree-based 
topology and works in such a way that the schedule of one node is synchronised with 
the schedule of the next hop node. 
Algorithm for DMAC 
Node sends a packet to the next hop node on the route 
The node awaits acknowledgment 
The next hop node enters receiving state at the same time 
If this next hop node is not the destination node 
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 The node enters sending state to forward the packet 
Else the final destination has been reached 
If sender does not receive ACK 
 It queues the message until the next sending  
If node has multiple packets to send 
 It increases its duty cycle 
 It requests other nodes along the sink route to increase theirs too 
5. RMAC Algorithm (Adaptive reservation). This protocol allows nodes to negotiate 
their schedules. 
 
Algorithm for RMAC 
During the SYNC phase, nodes synchronise their clocks. 
During the data phase, the sender waits for a randomly chosen period of time plus an 
additional DIFS period 
If no activity is detected, the sender transmits a Pioneer Control Frame (PION) 
The next hop node along the route looks up the next hop and forwards the PION to it 
after waiting for a SIFS period 
The process continues until destination is reached 
Data transmission begins during sleep period 
Each node returns ACK after receiving packet and returns to sleep mode 






 Latency Energy-efficiency Weighted Score 
Weight 40% 60%  
Static scheduled 
protocols 
50 50 52 
Adaptive group 
schedule 
60 60 60 
Adaptive repeated 
schedule 
70 60 64 
Adaptive staggered 
schedule 
90 80 84 
Adaptive reservation 
schedule 
80 90 86 










Justification for above scores 
The static scheduled protocols relatively has the highest latency and is also the poorest on 
energy efficiency because of the fixed duty cycle which then means that in networks with low 
traffic, the node may listen for longer than usual thereby leading to energy loss and also delay. 
Also, it provides no cross-layer support. 
The adaptive grouped schedule has a relatively better performance during traffic fluctuation 
because of its (Future-request-to-send) FRTS feature and adaptive timeout which allows it to 
sleep when there’s no traffic and stay awake when there’s more traffic hence increasing 
energy efficiency. However, in very high traffic transmission may suffer from latency due to 
simultaneous access to the channel by nodes with grouped active schedules. 
Adaptive repeated schedules are better in terms of end-to-end latency because of its periodic 
schedule channel polling thereby allowing for packet forwarding. However energy efficiency 
may not be improved because of its frequent channel polling using preambles. Per-hop 
latency may still be increased in very high traffic.  
Adaptive staggered schedule further improves end-to-end latency better than other 
protocols because of its ability to synchronise the transmission time of a node to the wake-
up time of the next hop node. It assumes the topology to be a unidirectional tree topology 
and this is one of its major limitation. Its converge-cast way of working may also lead to 
decreased energy-efficiency towards the sink due to the bottle neck problem. 
Adaptive reservation protocols improves on the bottle neck challenge of the staggered 
schedule by allowing nodes to negotiate with their neighbours when to transmit and receive 
packets thereby improving energy efficiency. 
3.3.3. Simulation Results and Analysis 
Simulation was carried out using OMNET++ and Castalia framework. This simulation is a 
bridge test application whereby the structural health of a bridge is monitored, a 40 metre 
bridge with 7 nodes and a 200 metre bridge with 34 nodes. Each node is arranged in form of 
a grid is 20 metres apart from the next node, hence this explains the number of nodes which 
correspond with the length of the bridge. A sample interval of 1000ms is used. Consumed 
energy is measured in mJoules.  
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The first section of charts below show the total consumed energy used in the simulation. The 
other section of the charts show the reception of the nodes. A tree-based topology is being 
used whereby nodes use multi-path routing to propagate data to the sink. Three protocols 
were tested: SMAC, TMAC and TunableMAC. The aim of this experiment is to understand the 
relationship between delay and energy efficiency and how a balance can be created or if need 
be, the kind of trade-offs required. 
TunableMAC 
TunableMAC is a protocol that was provided along with the WSN Framework, Castalia[17]. 
As the name implies, this algorithm is tuneable and allows 12 of its parameters to be tuned. 
This protocol can simulate many duty-cycling protocols but it does not support unicast. It 
uses CSMA for its transmission, therefore its persistence and backing off policies can be 
tuned. Its duty cycle can also be tuned as well as the train of beacons that can be used to 
wake up potential receivers. Below are the 12parameters that can be tuned: 
 
• Duty Cycle 
This is the fraction of time for which a node listens to the channel. The node sleeps 
the rest of the time. The default value is 1.0 meaning that the node listens for 100% 
of the time and hence no duty cycling. 
• Listen Interval 
While the duty cycle is expressed as a fraction, the listen interval is the exact 
duration of time for which the node listens and is expressed in milliseconds. The 
default value is 10 milliseconds. 
• Beacon Interval Fraction 
Unlike SMAC and TMAC, there is no schedule synchronisation and that means there 
has to be a way of getting the attention of the sleeping node before a broadcast is 
made. Beacons can be used to achieve this and the sending node sends a train of 
beacons for a period of time known as the beacon interval. However, this beacon 
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interval is expressed as a fraction of the sleeping interval and its default value is 1.0 
meaning that the beacon interval for the whole of the sleeping interval. 
• Probability of Transmission 
Every transmission is made with a probability of 1 by default. It is used alongside 
with the number retransmissions to calculate the expected number of transmissions 
per node. 
• Number of transmissions 
The default number of transmissions is 1 and if this number is increased, then the 
energy consumed is also increased. 
• Random Transmission Offset 
This is the random time a node waits, after it has sensed that the channel is clear, in 
order to avoid any collisions. The default value for this parameter is 0 meaning that 
there is no randomness. 
• Retransmission Interval 
This is the time gap between retransmissions. 
• Back-off Type 
This is a CSMA feature and the default number is 1 meaning that the node backs off 
for a constant time each time the channel is not clear for transmission. If it is 0, the 
back-off timer is set to the duration of the sleeping interval. If set to 2, then the 
back-off timer is based on the number of consecutive times the channel was found 
not to be clear. Hence the back-off timer is equal to the back-off base value 
multiplied by the number of consecutive times the channel was off. Setting the 
parameter to 3 means the back-off timer is also based on the consecutive number of 
times the channel was not clear and is calculated by (backoffBaseValue)times. 
• Back-off Base Value 
This is the constant time for which a node backs off as discussed earlier. The default 
value is 16. 
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• CSMA Persistence 
This determines how persistent the CSMA is. If it’s non-persistent with the value if 0 
(default) then it uses the back-off type and back-off base value. If it’s persistent (1-
persistent), then it does not back off and it keeps checking the channel until it’s free 
for it to transmit. This requires that the node polls the channel every 0.128 msecs. 
Another type of CSMA persistence is the p-persistence. If it’s p-persistent it also 
keeps polling until it finds the channel free for transmitting but it transmits only with 
the probability of p. 
• Transmit all packets in free channel 
This has a boolean value of either true or false and determines the behaviour of the 
nodes when the channel is free. With a default value of true, the node transmits all 
the packets in its buffer without the need to sense the channel. On the other hand a 
false value means that a node send only one packet from the MAC buffer and goes 
through the whole carrier sensing procedure again and sends beacons again to wake 
sleeping nodes. The disadvantage of the true value is that fairness is affected 
negatively. 
• Sleep during back-off 
With a duty cycle in place, a node will go to sleep when it backs off. The default 
value is false if there is no duty cycle as CSMA does not care about energy-efficiency. 
 
TunableMAC Algorithm[17] (Uses CSMA) 
Duty cycle of radio is set 
Set the listen interval and other necessary parameters 
Node senses the channel for a random period of time before transmitting 
If the channel is not clear,  
Then the node backs off based on CSMA 
If sleepduringbackoff property is set to true 
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 Node sleeps during the backoff period. 
Else 
A node broadcasts a train of beacons to wake up sleeping nodes 
 
Comparing SMAC, TMAC and TunableMAC 
Simulation Scenario 
The TunableMAC protocol is used alongside two other protocols, SMAC and TMAC in the 
simulation to understand the energy consumption and reception under different network 
sizes. The bridge sizes include a 40m bridge, a 200m bridge and a 1000m bridge. The 
simulation is about the structural health monitoring of a bridge. Sensing nodes are placed in 
a grid with a sink node in the middle. A car moves on the bridge every five minutes and 




No of nodes Duty Cycle Sample 
Interval(ms) 
40 7 0.1 (10%) 1000 
200 34 0.1 (10%) 1000 
1000 154 0.1 (10%) 1000 











Figure 23: Tunable MAC energy consumption 
 
Comparing TunableMAC with SMAC and TMAC 
 
Figure 24: Comparing SMAC,TMAC and TunableMAC 
The above three graphs show the energy consumption of SMAC, TMAC and TunableMAC 
under the different bridge sizes. SMAC increased from 1.505 in the 40m bridge to 1.521 in 
the 200m bridge and 1.531 in the 1000m bridge. TMAC increases from 1.169 to 1.358 to 
1.399 for the 40m, 200m and 1000m bridge respectively. Based on the figures for SMAC and 
TMAC the energy consumption is directly proportional to the bridge sizes meaning the 
larger the bridge, the more energy consumed.    However, this is not the case for 
TunableMAC where the energy consumption initially increases as the bridge size increases 
from 40m to 200m but then the energy decreases as the bridge size increases to 1000 
metres hence making it not directly proportional as in the case of SMAC and TMAC. It starts 
 83 
with 1.753 for the 40m bridge, then it increases to 1.848 for the 200m bridge and then 




Figure 25: Reception Ratio for Tunable MAC 
 
Figure 26: Tunable MAC Total packets 
The above graph in figure 7 shows the reception of packets at the sink in a 40m bridge for 
varying duty cycle. The results show that the reception increases with a higher duty cycle. 
Success increases as the duty cycle increases while failures decrease as the duty cycle 
increases. 
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The above figure 8 shows the reception of packets at the sink in a 200m bridge using a 
TunableMAC protocol. The total number of packets reaching the sink is less compared to 
the 40m bridge in figure 7. However, the same pattern occurs in both scenarios whereby the 
reception (successful packets) increases as the duty cycle increases.  
The above figure shows the reception for a 1000m bridge using the TunableMAC protocol. 
The packet reception also increases with an increase in duty cycle although in general the 
total number of packets received is less that than the 40m and 200m bridges. 
Comparing TunableMAC with SMAC and TMAC 
 
Figure 27: SMAC, TMAC and TunableMAC compared 
 
Figure 28: Total number of packets 
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The above figure compares SMAC, TMAC and TunableMAC in a 40m bridge and the results 
show that the TunableMAC receives more packets than SMAC and TMAC. SMAC and TMAC 
are similar in terms of their reception (2.683 and 2.633), although SMAC is slightly higher. 
 
The above three graphs compare the reception levels of SMAC, TMAC and TunableMAC under 
different bridge sizes. In the 40 metre bridge, SMAC and TMAC have a much lower reception 
(2.683 and 2.633 respectively) than TunableMAC (21.05). In the 200 metre bridge, a similar 
situation occurs, even though SMAC and TMAC show an improvement in reception, the 
results are still very low compared to TunableMAC. In the 1000 metre bridge, there is a huge 
drop in packet reception for TunableMAC although it still has a higher reception than SMAC 
and TMAC. In summary, TunableMAC performs better than SMAC and TMAC in terms of 
reception. 
Discussion and recommendation 
The results show that TunableMAC performs better than SMAC and TMAC in terms of 
throughput but consumes more energy than both of them. However, it is important to note 
that the difference in energy consumption between TunableMAC and the two others (SMAC 
and TMAC) is significantly smaller than the difference in throughput (reception) between 
TunableMAC and the two others. 
 
 
3.4. Proposed Approach.  
The intended approach is an improvement of existing approaches - Gateway Media Access 
Control (GMAC) and Hierarchical Collaborative Model (HCM). While GMAC [63] and the hash-
based scheme [4] use centralized approach via cluster heads, HCM [65] and the distributed 
wake-up scheme [66] use a distributed architecture. Although these approaches seem very 
useful, they do not take into consideration the size of the network especially on a large scale. 
Our proposed architecture is based on a combination of both the centralized and the 
distributed approach. It would involve the use of intelligent agents whereby each sensor 
becomes an agent which can sense data and take responsive action with the workload 
dynamically distributed among them. However, this would not function optimally with the 
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current battery-powered sensors, but rather an energy harvested IEEE 802.15.4 wireless 
sensor network [62]. This is necessary because the dynamic distribution would lead to an 
increase in processing power thereby consequently increasing energy costs. In [67], the 
concept of virtual clusters is introduced whereby nodes are grouped into the same subnet 
and presented as a single resource. The WSN will be dynamically divided into clusters with 
cluster heads appointed for each cluster. In this approach, if a sensor encounters or senses 
an attack, it immediately takes responsive action and also broadcasts the information to the 
rest of the appointed cluster heads via a “rumour” approach which may consume more 
bandwidth than processing power. The “rumour” approach is coined from the term “routing 
by rumour”, which explains the semantics of distance-vector routing protocols whereby each 
router sends messages to its nearest neighbour until the information propagates to all the 
routers. In this case, the cluster heads send information to the nearest cluster head and it 
continues that way until the information gets to all the cluster heads which then pass the 
information to their clusters. The cluster heads then relay this information to the sensors in 
their clusters. 
3.4.1. High Level Constituents of the Approach 
• Automated reasoning via intelligent agents 
In [68] a management scheme based on automated reasoning whereby Bayesian 
reasoning is used during the learning phase, is proposed to help protect against intrusions 
and also enhance energy-efficiency on a wireless sensor network. Threshold analysis is 
also used prior to the reasoning. In [69], the BayesMob algorithm is used for self-healing 
in a case where one or more sensor nodes fail. In this thesis, we consider the Bayesian 
equation for predictive reasoning by sensors as a way of anticipating an attack and 




where A and B are events 
- P (A) and P (B) are the probabilities of A and B without regard to each other. 
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- P (A | B), a conditional probability, is the probability of observing event A given that 
B is true. 
- P (B | A) is the probability of observing event B given that A is true. 
In this context, for example, P (A) is the base rate or prior probability that a sensor is 
under attack. This could be based on a threshold value of the amount of energy being 
consumed by the sensor. P (B) could be the probability that the messages sent by the 
attacker have a certain size/frequency range. P (B|A) would then be the probability that 
a sensor under attack is receiving a certain message size/frequency range. 
• Choice of WSN architecture  
A combination of centralised and distributed architecture is proposed. The centralised 
approach involves the use of clusters which are formed dynamically based on the location 
and proximity of sensors. Each cluster has a cluster head which not only serves the other 
sensors but also acts as a proxy thereby hiding the identity of the sensors. At the cluster 
level, a single-hop architecture is used while a multi-hop architecture is used for 
communication between cluster heads. Because of its centralised approach, the single-
hop architecture has low delay and a high channel capacity, while the multi-hop 
architecture which is distributed in nature has a high energy-efficiency and high signal-
to-noise ratio [72]. 
• Resource availability (via energy-harvesting rather than battery-powered sensors) 
In [70], a relationship between autonomy and energy-efficiency is established whereby 
existing wireless sensor networks are limited by their battery power and therefore 
cannot be autonomous except more power is made available to them. Hence, energy-
harvesting is proposed. In [71], the need for energy harvesting is also acknowledged 
considering that the existing battery-powered sensor nodes need periodic maintenance 
which contradicts with sthe characteristics of autonomous systems. 
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Figure 29: Proposed Wireless Sensor Network Architecture for Intelligent Agents (Sensors) 
 
 
Figure 30: Model for Energy-efficiency and Security 
Figure 29 above shows an attack being directed at a cluster head. The cluster head (CH) is an 
intelligent agent and also acts as a proxy for the member-nodes of its cluster. The moment it 
realizes it is under attack, it appoints one of its members as a cluster head and isolates itself 
from the network thereby allowing communication to continue. The learned information is 
then passed to other cluster heads to enable them to easily prevent the attack, in case they 
become the new target. 
The novel architecture is intended to fit into the big picture of providing an energy-efficient 
and autonomous security on the IoT. This architecture builds on that of G-MAC which uses 
clustering to create a centralised architecture. With this architecture, the cluster heads act as 
a gateway, hence no communication can be made to the cluster nodes except through the 
gateway. However, one limitation of GMAC is that the clusters are real and therefore do not 
consider mobility and change in topology. Hence the proposed architecture considers virtual 
Virtual Clustering 
Adaptive duty-cycling 




clusters. While GMAC considers energy-efficiency and network lifetime under denial-of-sleep 
attacks, there is no evidence of consideration of the effects on throughput and latency. The 
proposed architecture also intends to consider these aspects. Currently, the proposed 
approach is being tested on a simulator and the results will be analysed and discussed in the 
context of energy-efficiency and other existing approaches. 
Apart from the focus on adaptability and autonomy, the proposed approach is based on a 
framework recommended in [3] which includes the following 4 components: 
- Strong link layer authentication 
- Anti-replay protection 
- Jamming identification and mitigation 
- Broadcast attack protection 
The use of virtual rather than real clusters[18] is better in the sense that it is adaptable to any 
change in topology. Also, there’ll also be rotation of cluster heads depending on their 
availability and resource consumption. Secondly, an adaptive duty cycling would then be 
incorporated into the virtual clusters. Thirdly, a measurement-based security technique such 
as RSSI can then be introduced to protect against any form of jamming. The presence of virtual 
clusters also be utilised to only allow cluster-level broadcasts rather than network-wide 
broadcasts. 
Sources of energy loss 
- Collision 
- Overhearing 
- Control Overhead 
- Idle listening 
Conclusion 
One of the benefits of this research is that it shows the effect of duty cycling in MAC protocols 
and their effect on energy consumption. The interesting part is in the TunableMAC protocol 
which allows tuning of the duty cycle to see the energy levels. While it is obvious that energy 
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consumption is reduced with lower duty cycles, it is also important to know the cost involved 
in saving energy with regards to throughput and latency. This raised the question as to what 
degree of throughput is being traded to save energy. One way to answer this question is by 
measuring the report reception in the simulator. The results reveal that although SMAC and 
TMAC perform better than TunableMAC in terms of energy consumption, TunableMAC 








Chapter 4: Layered-MAC: 
Development of Energy-aware and 




“You never change things by fighting the existing reality. To change 





This chapter documents the development of a new MAC layer protocol which demonstrates 
an ability to tackle denial-of-sleep attacks better than the existing duty-cycled protocols 
discussed in previous chapters.  
One of the goals is to compare the new protocol with three simulated protocols – Sensor-
MAC (SMAC), Timeout-MAC (TMAC) and TunableMAC – based on performance metrics such 
as the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) and the Link Quality Indicator (LQI) 
 
Battery-powered sensors usually have a network lifetime of 3.5 years. However, a successful 
denial-of-sleep attack can reduce the lifespan of these sensors to 3 days. Such significant 
loss of energy requires a deeper look into the problem, hence the need for a protocol that is 
energy-efficient and protects against these attacks. This protocol will be implemented on 
two different platforms: a simulated environment using OMNET++ [137] and a small proof-
of-concept prototype using physical devices such as Sun SPOT [138]. More emphasis is 
placed on the simulation results rather than the real experiments using physical devices. 
This is because the simulation platform gives room for scalability allowing a variety of bridge 
sizes and numbers of nodes, whereas the physical platform is limited to just 3 devices. 
Hence, the physical devices are used as a proof-of-concept to support the simulation results. 
The created protocol also includes some inherent security features as part of the process of 
tackling denial-of-sleep attacks. The solution is evaluated based on how much of the sources 
of energy-loss it eliminates as well as how it responds in the event of a denial-of-sleep 
attack. These sources of energy loss include overhearing, idle listening, control packets 
overhead and collisions [120]. The new protocol tackles each of these sources of energy loss 
in a unique and secure way. The research begins by identifying the requirements of the 
protocol, specifying these requirements and prioritizing them using a technique called 
MoSCoW which indicates four priority categories – a) Must have; b) Should have; c) Could 
have; d) Would have [139]. Furthermore, different designs of the semantics of the protocol 
are produced and discussed. Algorithms are then produced for the protocol. These 
algorithms are implemented on the OMNET++ simulator and on a small test-bed with the 
Sun SPOT sensor devices. The language used for the simulation and device implementation 
are discussed critically based on different criteria. The chapter ends with a test plan on how 
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the two solutions will be tested in comparison to the requirements as well as in comparison 
to some selected existing MAC layer protocols. 
Below are some research questions that underpin the new protocol presented and 
evaluated in this thesis: 
• What happens when two nodes want to communicate with the cluster head 
simultaneously? 
• How does this solution handle collision? 
• How does this solution minimise control packets? 
• How does this solution tackle overhearing? 
• How does this solution minimise idle listening? 
• What happens when two cluster heads want to talk to the sink at the same time? 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides a summary of related 
work elsewhere. Section 4.3 lays emphasis on the development methodology followed in 
arriving at this protocol. Section 4.4  gives details of the program development (construction 
phase) of the protocol. Section 4.5 shows the results of the experiments, both simulations 
and physical experiments.  
4.2. Related Work 
It is pertinent to note that in the context of DoS, a number of approaches exist to curb these 
attacks, however the majority of them are techniques that do not take energy-efficiency 
into consideration and even when they do, throughput becomes a trade-off which could 
become counter-productive in the long run. The most notable existing approaches include 
Gateway-MAC (GMAC) [143], Hash-based scheme [144], Clustered adaptive rate limiting 
[118], Fake schedule switch scheme [145], Absorbing Markov chain (AMC) model [146], 
Secure wakeup scheme [147], Zero knowledge protocol [148] and Cross layer mechanism 
[149]. 
Recent work [91] compares SMAC, TMAC and 802.11 in terms of energy consumption and 
the results show that TMAC saves 25% more energy than SMAC. In another project [92], the 
same protocols are compared, however, more performance metrics are looked into such as 
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end-to-end delay, packet delivery ratio and throughput and similarly, TMAC does better than 
SMAC. In [93], SMAC, TMAC and CSMA/CA are compared in terms of energy saving and peak 
load handling. The findings show that TMAC takes the lead in terms of energy saving but does 
not do as good as SMAC and CSMA/CA in terms of peak handling. 
With respect to RSSI and LQI data, pattern recognition methodologies and clustering 
methods are used in [95] to process the data in order to find out the number of nodes in an 
unknown neighbouring WSN. This is done with the intention of maintaining network security. 
While RSSI indicates the strength of the signal, LQI indicates the quality of the signal. In [96], 
the limitations of RSSI which include being affected by environmental factors such as 
reflection, refraction, electromagnetic fields and diffraction are discussed. Hence, there’s a 
need for another metric such as LQI, which is not affected by these environmental factors as 
much as RSSI. Combining these two metrics would guarantee more valid results. 
 
One of the existing protocols that has geared towards energy-efficiency as well as security is 
the GMAC protocol. GMAC protocol uses the idea of a central management where nodes 
are divided into clusters and each cluster has a gateway node. One of the strategies used in 
tackling denial-of-sleep attacks is by understanding the impact of a failed node on the entire 
network lifetime. This is evidenced in [116] where the most critical node is assessed in terms 
of the impact of its elimination on the network lifetime. On the other hand, in [117] and 
[118], an intrusion detection scheme (IDS) is proposed whereby a DOS attacks are detected 
before it has any impact thereby making it preventive. In [126], focus is placed on creating 
hard-to-guess tokens/beacons which prevents attackers from easily guessing tokens that 
are aimed at depleting battery life. In [134], a cluster-based security protocol which uses 
digital signatures is proposed, however, this does not consider energy-efficiency. Another 
protocol is proposed in [135] and is based on Public key cryptography. However, this 
protocol seems to introduce a lot of overhead that comes with key exchange and 
management.  
Protocols 
The MAC layer of the OSI model is usually exploited by denial-of-sleep attacks and the 
Gateway-MAC (GMAC) is a protocol developed to guard specifically against broadcast attacks 
 94 
[76]. GMAC saves a lot of energy via its centralised cluster management approach and has a 
better network lifetime than other protocols such as the SMAC, TMAC and Berkeley-MAC 
(BMAC).  
Zero Knowledge Protocol (ZKP) works with the interlock protocol for key transfer and helps 
to tackle main-in-the-middle and replay attacks [73]. This protocol is not energy-efficient 
enough as it combines authentication and interlock protocol as part of its protection. It does 
not apply enough intelligence in tackling a variety of attacks 
 
Schemes 
The hash-based scheme protects against barrage attacks and works by protecting cluster 
heads against intrusion [71]. Similar to GMAC, it works by protecting the cluster heads against 
intrusion which is energy-efficient but not autonomous enough to guard against attacks to 
sensors other than the cluster heads. CARL classifies incoming packets based on authentication 
tests and anti-replay checks [67]. This is energy-efficient and relatively positive on throughput 
but has a relatively low autonomy because of its use of current host-based intrusion detection 
methods which do not take the distributed nature of sensors into consideration. If there is a 
high amount of traffic more than anticipated by the protection mechanism, then the rate 
limiting may go out of hand thereby even negatively affecting throughput. The fake schedule 
switch scheme uses the RSSI measurement aid in protecting against collision, exhaustion and 
broadcast attacks [75]. It works by increasing the energy usage of the attacker which may 
affect throughput if the fake schedule switch is not done accurately. Although there is some 
form of autonomy in this method, throughput remains at stake. The secure wake-up scheme 
finds a way to authenticate messages while ensuring that a node doesn’t change to active state 
[72]. This is quite energy efficient in nature but due to its way of working make affect network 
throughput if proper authentication is not done in keeping a sensor from waking up which 
could negatively affect throughput. Two-tier secure scheme (TSS) integrates with a MAC 
protocol in addition to using a hash-chain to counter replay and forge attacks [74]. While this 
may affect more than one layer, it may have a negative effect on energy-consumption and 




The Absorbing Markov Chain (AMC) approach is a mathematical model which is used in 
calculating the expected death time of a sensor network and using that to determine the 
presence of a denial-of-sleep attack [77]. While this may have some form of autonomy in its 
approach, it may affect network throughput because of its procedural complexity and may 
sometimes not be energy-efficient. The hierarchical collaborative model (HCM) uses anomaly 
detection technique to detect denial-of-sleep attacks using a distributed approach whereby 
workload is spread across components in a hierarchical manner [65]. Its anomaly detection 
technique is quite static in nature and may not be intelligent enough to detect some attacks 
which may function below the threshold. Cross Layer Mechanism (CLM) focuses not just on 
the MAC layer as in the case of GMAC, but also focuses on the network and physical layers 
[68]. It also uses RSSI like in the fake schedule-switch scheme to prevent replay attacks. It is 
quite low on autonomy as it doesn’t consider a variety of scenarios and can have a negative 
impact on throughput. 
 
4.3. Development Methodology 
Reverse engineering was one of the methods used to understand how one of the existing 
protocols works. The reverse engineering was done on a protocol called TunableMAC to 
understand the code components. TunableMAC was created using two languages- NED and 
C++. NED was used to define the network including its parameters and gates while C++ was 
used to define the behavior of the MAC protocol. The platform for these languages is 
OMNET++ and this was used alongside a framework for wireless sensor networks called 
Castalia. The C++ codes consisted of two files- a header file which contained a declaration of 
the variables and methods and another file which contained an initialization of the variables 
and implementation of the methods. The reverse engineering was done to understand the 
sequence and effect of the methods as well as the states of the variables. Hence a sequence 
diagram and state diagram are produced for the TunableMAC protocol. The diagrams 
provide a better understanding of where to insert the algorithms for the new protocol. 
In building the new protocol, a traditional software development life cycle (SDLC) was used, 
particularly the incremental model/iterative model. This involved building the protocol in 
small increments. Each increment involved all the stages of the SDLC which are described 
briefly below: 
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• Requirements gathering/analysis. This stage involves understanding the problem and 
deciding on what needs to be done. In some cases, these two stages are split 
individually but considering the scope of this protocol, not much requirements are 
required. Hence the two stages can be combines into one. The requirement is then 
clearly specified.  
• Design. This stage involves producing a blueprint of the internal workings of the system 
be it high-level or low-level design. One design could be a flow chart showing the flow 
of information in the protocol. Another design could be a sequence diagram showing 
the sequence of method calls for the new protocol. A class diagram showing the 
methods and variables of the new protocol is also an important design to include 
• Implementation. At this stage, the coding will be done either for the simulator (in C++ 
and NED) or for the Sun SPOT sensor (in Java). This stage involves testing the codes to 
first check that they meet the requirements and that they perform better than existing 
protocols at tackling denial-of-sleep attacks. 
• Existing approaches are classified in terms of their semantics and function and are then 
reviewed. Secondly, three protocols vulnerable to denial-of-sleep attacks are simulated in 
OMNET++ and Castalia framework to measure the RSSI and the LQI parameters of these 
three protocols under three network sizes. The simulation scenario is a bridge with three 
different sizes (40m, 200m and 1000m) and nodes (7 nodes, 34 nodes and 154 nodes 
respectively). The sizes and the number of nodes are increased in a linear fashion, 
however, this is limited to the topology of the scenario where there is one sink node in 
the middle. Other topologies could be considered as part of future work on mobility. The 
average value for the RSSI for all nodes is measured for each of the three MAC protocols 
under the three bridge sizes. The same is done for the LQI. The protocols simulated are 
discussed below: 
• SMAC is a duty-cycle based MAC protocol which has a fixed listen interval. One of the 
disadvantages of this is that of there is very low traffic the energy is wasted during the 
listen phase. On the other hand, if there is very high traffic, throughput may be hindered 
as the listen time may not be enough. Therefore, there is a need to have an adaptive listen 
time which TMAC provides. Another challenge with SMAC is that the duty cycle 
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parameters are decided in advance and this may not be suitable for networks with rapidly 
changing topologies. Another challenge is that it does not have random offset and 
therefore there may be collisions during broadcasts and Request-To-Send/Clear-To-Send 
does not work for broadcasts [66]. 
• The TMAC protocol has two major strong areas. One of them is the adaptive listening 
interval which adapts the listen interval according to the traffic level. Another strong point 
is the future-request-to-send technique which addresses the early sleeping problem. 
However, in order to conserve energy, TMAC sends messages between small periods of 
time and this may have an effect on throughput in high traffic-load networks. 
• TunableMAC [90] is a protocol that was provided along with the WSN Framework, 
Castalia. As the name implies, this algorithm is tuneable and allows 12 of its parameters 
to be tuned. This protocol can simulate many duty-cycling protocols, but it does not 
support unicast. It uses CSMA for its transmission, therefore its persistence and backing 
off policies can be tuned. Its duty cycle can also be tuned as well as the train of beacons 
that can be used to wake up potential receivers. 
 
4.4. Protocol Implementation 
A. Requirements Identification 
a) Problem Statement. Denial-of-sleep attacks can have a strong negative impact on 
the life span of battery-powered wireless sensors. Considering that the radio is 
the major source of energy loss, these attacks take advantage of the MAC layer, 
which is responsible for access to the radio, and use certain techniques to 
prevent the radio from sleeping thereby reducing the lifespan of the sensor. 
While there have been proposed solutions and techniques to tackling these 
attacks, only one of these solutions (GMAC) has been incorporated into a 
protocol and tested on a real device. There is therefore a need for more MAC 
layer protocols that have a form of security against denial-of-sleep attacks while 
aiming at maintaining the same or similar level of throughput and latency as 
protocols that do not have these security measures.  
b) Protocol Requirements. The protocol should be able to detect a denial-of-sleep 
attack and take measures to reduce its impact. In a case where the protocol is 
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not able to detect the denial-of sleep attack on time, it should take measures to 
reduce the other sources of energy loss that are not because of an attack. In this 
way the sensor can have enough energy to continue functioning until it detects 
the attack. To detect the attack, the first step is to understand the possible attack 
strategies that could be used: 
• Attack from an unauthorized authenticated node - In this scenario, the node’s identity 
is verified and valid, however the action of the node is not authorized. 
• Attack from an authorized and authenticated node - This is a more dangerous scenario 
as it is more difficult to detect such a node. In this case the entire identity has been 
compromised. Sybil node attacks fall under this category. 
• Attack from an unauthenticated and unauthorized node – This is the least dangerous 
of the three strategies. 
The next step would be to identify the target of the attack. This is important because an 
attack on a sink node would have more impact that an attack on a cluster head. Similarly, an 
attack on a cluster head would have more impact than an attack on a normal node. After 
identifying the target, the next step is to get some data about the attacker node beginning 
with its address and RSSI and LQI for that node. After the node has been identified, the next 
step is to isolate the attacker and make the network inaccessible by that node. 
The life cycle of the MAC layer is divided into four stages as follows: 
• The start-up stage. This stage involves initializing the variables with start-up information 
about the packets, sensors and communication. This also involves getting the node to 
sleep if there is no information from the radio layer or there’s nothing left in the buffer 
to send to the network layer. At this stage the cluster heads will also be set up. 
• The transmit stage. This stage involves transmitting information received from the 
network layer to the radio layer or transmitting information received from the radio 
layer to the network layer.  
• Carrier sensing stage. Before transmitting, a node may want to apply some CSMA 
techniques or use request-to-send or clear-to-send packets to avoid collisions and 
overhearing. While RTS/CTS could be helpful in avoiding collisions, it has one 
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disadvantage of increasing the control packet overhead which further increases the 
energy consumption. CSMA on the other had has some back-off techniques that work 
based on probability and may not always be accurate and could lead to deadlock 
problems where a node is not able to transmit because if waiting endlessly for an 
opportunity to transmit. 
• The receive stage. The involves staying in a receive mode and waiting for information 
from the radio layer which is coming from another node. The data received has to be 
checked to know the type of data (control packet or actual data). 
B. Functional Requirements 
As mentioned earlier, the MoSCoW technique is used to prioritize the requirements based 
on the following categories: 
Must Have 
• The sink node should be able to get the RSSI and LQI values of every sensor it receives 
data from. 
• Each node should know how far it is from the sink node and use that to decide who 
becomes a cluster head. 
• The protocol should be able to adjust the duty cycle at run-time based on the traffic. 
• The protocol should allow cluster heads to be appointed and rotated at intervals, if 
need be. 
• The protocol should allow for a node to be isolated from the network when it has been 
discovered to be an attacker node. 
Should Have 
• Nodes should be able find the least expensive route to communicate their data. 
• Cluster heads should be able to communicate using code division multiple access. 
Could Have 
• Supervised learning could be applied on the data collected from the base station. 
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Would Have 
• Nodes cannot be powered by Solar energy. 
I. Program Development 




getDistance() Double distance 
getRSSI() Double RSSI 





assessPackets() Double packetSize 
isolateNode() int nodeID 
 
 
A. Algorithm for Proposed MAC Protocol 
• MAC layer receives number of nodes from the application layer. 
• Sink node gets the distance of all nodes. 
• Sink node appoints the node with closest proximity as a cluster head. 
• If a cluster head has more than 5 nodes assigned to it, then another cluster head is 
appointed. 
• Nodes must only communicate to their cluster heads not to other nodes. 
 101 
• The cluster head then passes the information to the sink nodes. If the sink node is too 
far from the cluster head, then the data is passed to other cluster heads closer to the 
sink node. 
• After every 5 minutes, a new cluster head is appointed to ensure security and to also 
manage the energy-efficiency. 
B. Protocol Design 
 
Figure 31: Flow chart showing MAC layer Setup 
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Figure 32: Conceptual model of components of proposed proactive energy-efficient MAC protocol. 
Figure 32 shows the conceptual design of the protocol. The lowest layer is virtual clustering 
which involves grouping the sensors based on their proximity. The benefits of keeping the 
clusters virtual is that if the position of the sensor is changed, then the cluster can be 
reconfigured. The adaptive duty cycling is adopted form TMAC whereby the duty cycle 
automatically adjusts to the amount of traffic. 
Getting the positions and distance between nodes 
This involves using a points-based system/GPS to get the x and y coordinates of the sensor. 
After getting the x and y coordinates for each node, the next step would be to calculate the 
distance between the two nodes. The distance between the nodes is calculated using the 
following formula based on Pythagorean theorem: 
  
Where d = distance 
x2 = the x coordinate for node 2 
x1 = the x coordinate for node 1 
y2 = the y coordinate for node 2 
y1 = the y coordinate for node 1 
One of the advantages of using GPS is its relative better accuracy at identifying the location 
of a device. However, this method may not work for sensors located in areas where the GPS 
may not work. 
Another way to achieve this by using the Castalia framework is to get the Received Signal 
Strength Indicator (RSSI) and the Link Quality Indicator (LQI). However, this method has its 
Virtual Clustering 
Adaptive duty-cycling 





disadvantages. When using RSSI measurements, the channel model parameter variation 
could lead to dead spots, multi-path effect, interference and noise could affect the signal 
strength and link quality. One method of improving the accuracy is to combine both RSSI 
and LQI[141] is making measurements and this was the method used for this project. 
Algorithm for position and distance of nodes 
• Each node waits for a random time and makes a broadcast. 
• The broadcast packet contains the schedule and each node follows the schedule it 
receives. 
• Each node also keeps the RSSI/LQI of the packet it receives. 
• Get position of nodes. 
• Base station creates a map of the distance between nodes using RSSI. 
• Identify best distance from each node. 
• Create Clusters based on best distance. 
• Use CDMA to communicate between cluster heads. 
• Stop. 
Base station creates a map of the distance between the nodes 
This involves creating a matrix that maps the distance between each node. If there are ten 
nodes, each node maps the distance with 9 other nodes. The mapping is based on the RSSI 
and LQI values of the sensor nodes. 
Identify best distance from each node 
Based on the map created above, the best distance for each node is then calculated. The 
reason for using distance is to enhance the energy-efficiency in the nodes when 
transmitting data. 
Create clusters based on best distance 
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Based on the best distance, the clusters are then created with cluster heads managing 
nodes within the closest distance. Only the cluster heads communicate directly with the 
base station/sink node. The cluster heads will be changed at intervals to increase security. 
Algorithm for cluster creation 
• If nodes have the same schedule, they belong to the same cluster. 
• Cluster nodes can only communicate with their cluster head. 
• Cluster heads then communicate with the sink node. 
Use CDMA to communicate between cluster heads 
Code division multiplexing is then used only for communication between cluster heads to 
















Parameters for existing protocols (TMAC and 802.15 MAC) 
In building the new protocol, parameters from existing protocols (Time-out MAC and 
802.15.4 MAC) were used. 
Figure 33 shows the default parameters for TMAC in OMNET++ simulator. Figure 34 shows 
the parameters for IEEE 802.15.4 MAC on the OMNET++ simulator. 
Figure 33: TMAC parameters 
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Figure 34: IEEE 802.15.4 parameters 

































4.5. Experiments  
A. Test Plan 




Test Case Description Actions 
1 Collision This checks 
that the 
protocol plays 
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Test Results from Simulator 
In this section, the results from both the OMNET++ and Castalia simulator and the Sun SPOT 
devices are compared. Furthermore, these results from both simulator and device for the 
Layered-MAC protocol are then compared with the results from SMAC and TMAC. The 
results are shown below. GMAC has not been used in the comparisons for two reasons. 
Firstly because there is no model of it in the Castalia simulator and secondly because GMAC 

























Figure 35: Energy Consumption for 40m, 200m and 1000m Bridge 
. 
a) Consumed Energy. The first graph in Figure 35(a) shows the energy consumed for 







increases as the duty cycle increases.The second graph in Figure 35 shows the 
energy consumption for Layered-MAC in a 200m bridge. The energy consumed in the 
200m appears less that the energy consumed in 40m bridge. The third graph in 
Figure 35 shows the energy consumption for the 1000m bridge for which energy 






















  Figure 36: Energy Comparison for SMAC, TMAC and Layered-MAC on 
40m, 200m and 1000m Bridge. 
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b) Energy Comparisons. The graphs in Figure 36 show a comparison of Layered-mac 
with two other protocols (TMAC and SMAC). The comparison is based on the energy 
consumption of the sensors. The graph in Figure 36(a) shows that TMAC consumes 
the least energy while Layered-MAC consumes the most energy. However, this does 
not take into consideration the packet reception at the sink. In the second graph, 
energy is compared on a 200m bridge for SMAC, TMAC and Layered-MAC and 
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Layered-MAC consumes the most energy at 1.848 while TMAC consumes the least 




















Figure 37: Reception for SMAC, TMAC and Layered-MAC on 40m, 200m and 1000m Bridge 
. 
c) Reception Comparisons. The second graph in Figure 37b shows that layered-MAC has 





failure of 17.088 compared to SMAC and TMC which are significantly lower. The 
third graph (Figure 37c) shows that layered-MAC has a better reception at the sink in 
terms of data throughput. There is a greater amount of succeeded and failed packets 
than in TMAC and SMAC. 
In conclusion, while the energy consumption is total is higher for Layered-MAC than TMAC 
and SMAC, the receptions results show that Layered-MAC still does better in terms of 
performance and even energy consumption when measured in terms energy per 
successfully received packets received packets. 
Another interesting observation is that although more energy is pent as the bridge size 
increases, the successfully received packets shows a downward trend for both TMAC and 
SMAC but is slightly different for Layered-MAC. 
Hence, on a 40m bridge for LayeredMAC, 1.752 is spent for 21.05 received packets. On a 
200m bridge, 1.848 is spent for 11.088 received packets and 1.587 for 2.223 received 
packets on a 1000m bridge. Summing up the received packets for TMAC and SMAC put 
together still doesn’t get up to half the reception for Layered-MAC. 
4.6. Results and Analysis 
For RSSI, the higher the value, the higher the signal strength. For the LQI parameter, the 
lower the value, the better the quality. Figures 38-43 show the RSSI and LQI for SMAC, TMAC 
and TunableMAC respectively. Figures 44 and 45 show the three protocols in two graphs for 
RSSI and LQI respectively. 
 
 
Figure 38: RSSI for SMAC protocol under three network sizes 
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Figure 38 shows how the RSSI parameter gets weaker as the network size increases for the 
SMAC protocol. It is important to note that SMAC has a fixed-duty cycle 
 
Figure 39: LQI for SMAC under three network sizes 
 
Figure 39 shows how the link quality gets better with increase in network size for the SMAC 
protocol. While TMAC performs better than SMAC in terms of RSSI under the 40m bridge - as 
seen in Figures 38 and 40, SMAC performs better than TMAC in terms of LQI - as seen in Figures 
39 and 41. 
 
 
Figure 40: RSSI for TMAC under three network sizes 
 
Figure 40 shows how the signal strength reduces as the network size increases. Compared 
to Figure 38, the RSSI parameter for the 40m bridge in Figure 40 is slightly stronger than that 




Figure 41: LQI for TMAC under three network sizes 
 
Figure 41 shows how the link quality improves as the network size increases. Overall, the 






Figure 42: RSSI for TunableMAC under three bridge sizes 
In Figure 42, signal strength weakens as the network size increases from 40m to 200m but 
then the signal strength slightly gets better with the 1000m bridge. The RSSI for the 40m bridge 




Figure 43: LQI for TunableMAC under different bridge sizes 
 
 
In Figure 43, the link quality gets better as the network size increases. The overall LQI for 
TunableMAC is weaker than SMAC and TMAC. 
  
 
Figure 44:Comparing RSSI for SMAC, TMAC and TunableMAC 
In Figure 44, RSSI is strongest in the 40m bridge with TunableMAC having the best 
performance. In the 1000m bridge, TunableMAC also has the strongest signal strength among 
the three protocols. Only in the 200m bridge does this trend with TMAC having the strongest 





Figure 45: Comparing LQI for SMAC, TMAC and TunableMAC 
In Figure 45, the 1000m bridge has the best link quality with SMAC having the strongest 
link quality. SMAC also maintains the strongest link quality in the 40m bridge but performs 
differently in the 200m bridge where TunableMAC has the best performance. 
 
4.6.1.  Simulation results for the protocols under attack  
Simulation Scenario 
The TunableMAC protocol is used alongside two other protocols, SMAC and TMAC in the 
simulation to understand the energy consumption and reception under an attack. For this 
scenario, a 200m bridge is used with 3 of the nodes as compromised malicious nodes which 
use a broadcast attack to stop nodes from sleeping. The broadcast attack is carried out by 
continuously flooding the network with broadcast messages from these three nodes. The 
simulation is about the structural health monitoring of a bridge. Sensing nodes are placed in 
a grid with a sink node in the middle. A car moves on the bridge every five minutes and 








Figure 46: Energy Efficiency for SMAC, TMAC and LayeredMAC 
 
 
Figure 47: Throughput for SMAC, TMAC and LayeredMAC under Denial-of-sleep attack 
Discussion of Results 
Figures 46 and 47 show the energy-efficiency and throughput for 3 MAC protocols 
respectively, including the new protocol (LayeredMAC), under a denial-of-sleep attack. 
GMAC has not been used in the comparisons for two reasons. Firstly, because there is no 
model of it in the Castalia simulator and secondly because GMAC does not give any 


















Throughput for MAC protocols under attack
 120 
Figure 46 shows that under the DOS broadcast attack, SMAC consumes the highest amount 
of energy at 1.54 mjoules. TMAC consumes much lower energy than SMAC at 1.41 mjoules. 
LayeredMAC consumes the least energy slightly below TMAC at 1.408 mjoules. The fixed 
duty cycling for SMAC justifies the relatively high energy consumption. TMAC on the other 
hand supports adaptive duty-cycling, hence there is better energy-efficiency than SMAC. 
LayeredMAC on the other hand goes a step further than just adaptive duty-cycling to also 
detect signal strength and link quality, hence the slightly better energy-saving than TMAC. 
In terms of throughput, figure 47 shows significant difference in throughput between 
LayeredMAC and TMAC and SMAC combined. This is partly because of LayeredMAC’s ability 
to detect a malicious node and adjust duty cycling to bypass/isolate the malicious node. 
Physical Device Experiments (Sun SPOT) 
This section presents the experiments with three Sun SPOT devices. One of them is a base 
station and the other two are temperature sensors. 
a) Centralized Architecture. The first experiment was a centralized approach where 
one node was assigned the role of a sink node and the other two nodes had to 
forward temperature data sensed to the sink node. The layered-MAC protocol 
was implemented on the sensors using Java. Netbeans Integrated Development 
Environment was used for writing the Java codes. 
Centralised Architecture Showing Connection Between Two Nodes and Base Station. 
b) Ad-hoc Architecture. The second experiment was a de-centralized approach 
whereby the sensor nodes may or may not be directly connected to the sink node 
depending on their distance from the sink node. The sensor nodes send the data 
to the nearest node to them. 






c) Details of the Sun SPOT Sensors. A Sun SPOT sensor consists of three basic 
elements: 
• Battery: Has a lithium rechargeable battery 
• Processor Board: This consists of a 32 bits ARM920T processor with a speed of 18 MHz. 
On the board is also a radio based on IEEE 802.15.4 standard. A RAM of 512KB as well as 
4MB of flash memory is also present. 
• Sensor Board: The sensor board consists of 3 axes accelerometer 2G/6G, a light sensor, a 
temperature sensor, two buttons, eight 24 bits RGB leds, 6 analog inputs, 5 general I/O 
pins and 4 high current output pins. 
 
Sun SPOT Sensor. 
In terms of software, a virtual machine called Squawk which is based on Java Micro Edition 
(J2ME) runs on the device. This software is designed for devices with limited memory. A 
transducer library exists which supports all the sensors and helps with energy-efficiency. 
Mesh networking is supported by this sensor.  
d) Setting up the Sensor Network. 
IV. Power Usage for a Typical Sun SPOT [27] 
 
 122 
Table IV shows the power usage of the Sun SPOT in different modes. Considering that the 
goal is to improve the energy-efficiency of the sensors, it is important to understand the 
current draw of energy as shown in the figure above. 
e) Carrying out the Experiments. 
 
Code Snippet for Monitoring Temperature. 
The code in Figure 11 was implemented to enable the sensors to sense the temperature 
and send a message when the temperature goes below 0 degrees. 
f) Experimental Results. 
 
Link Quality Between Nodes. 
The above figure shows the link quality which works alongside the received signal strength 
indicator in helping with the measurement of distance between nodes as discussed in [142]. 
The power stats during experiment without Layered-MAC protocol are: 
 Power controller version: PCTRL-2.01 
Battery charging current: 2 mA 
Current drawn from battery: 90 mA 
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Max current drawn: 287 mA 
Battery voltage: 3493 mv 
Main board I/O voltage: 3118 mV 
ARM CPU voltage: 1836mV 
External Voltage: 0mV 
USB voltage: 93 mV 
Power fault status: No power fault 
Reason for last interrupt: Cold boot, Button event, Sleep 
Start-up time : 1986 us 
Externally powered : false 
The results show the energy consumption before the Layered-MAC protocol was 
introduced. After implementing the Layered-MAC protocol the current drawn from the 
battery was reduced from 90 mA to 87 mA for one sensor and the maximum current drawn 
was reduced from 287 mA to 278 mA. This seems like a small difference with one sensor but 
will have a huge impact when looking at a larger network of 1000 nodes as seen in the 
simulations done earlier. 
4.7.  PROPOSED AUTONOMOUS APPROACH 
In addition to the aforementioned results, an approach is proposed that could help curb 
and minimize the impact of a denial-of-sleep attack. 
 
 
Figure 48: Proposed WSN architecture for intelligent agents 
Figure 48 shows the architecture of the proposed approach [94] which is an improvement 
of two existing approaches – GMAC and HCM. As discussed earlier, while GMAC and the hash-
based scheme use centralised approach via cluster heads, HCM and the distributed wake-up 
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scheme use a distributed architecture. Although these approaches seem very useful, they do 
not take into consideration the size of the network especially on a large scale.  
Our proposed architecture is based on a combination of both the centralised and the 
distributed approach thereby taking advantage of the benefits of both GMAC and HCM. It 
would involve the use of intelligent agents whereby each sensor becomes an agent which can 
sense data and take responsive action with the workload dynamically distributed among 
them. However, this would not function optimally with the current battery-powered sensors, 
but rather an energy harvested IEEE 802.15.4 WSN [78]. This is necessary because the 
dynamic distribution would lead to an increase in processing power thereby consequently 
increasing energy costs.  
Earlier work [79] introduced the concept of virtual clusters whereby nodes are grouped 
into the same subnet and presented as a single resource. The WSN will be dynamically divided 
into clusters with cluster heads appointed for each cluster. In this approach, if a sensor 
encounters or senses a denial-of-sleep attack, it immediately takes responsive action and also 
broadcasts the information to the rest of the appointed cluster heads via a “rumour” 
approach which may consume more bandwidth than processing power. The “rumour” 
approach is coined from the term “routing by rumour”, which explains the semantics of 
distance-vector routing protocols whereby each router sends messages to its nearest 
neighbour until the information propagates to all the routers. In this case, the cluster heads 
send information to the nearest cluster head and it continues that way until the information 
gets to all the cluster heads which then pass the information to their clusters. The cluster 
heads then relay this information to the sensors in their clusters. 
4.8. CONCLUSION 
It is important to look at how the research questions discussed in the introduction have 
been addressed. CSMA with collision avoidance is used to prevent collisions when two 
nodes are trying to communicate at the same time. Acknowledgements are not required to 
reduce the number of control packets. Minimizing the number of broadcasts by applying 
distance measurements and using a routing-by-rumor approach helps reduce overhearing. 
Idle listening is reduced by adaptive duty cycling. One of the benefits of this new protocol is 
that it is multi-layered and touches on different aspects. First it deals with virtual clustering 
[136], authentication, RSSI and LQI measurements which helps with security. It also 
measures the distance between nodes and supports adaptive duty-cycling which helps with 
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energy-consumption. Furthermore, the physical device experiments validate the results of 
the simulations as the energy measurements derived from the device have a correlation 
with the results from the Sun SPOT devices. 
 
The novelty of this chapter lies in the simulation results and the comparisons between the 
three protocols as well as the new proposed architecture for tackling denial-of-sleep attacks. 
As discussed in Section II, although there have been comparisons of SMAC and TMAC, as well 
as analysis of RSSI and LQI data, however, no research to the best of our knowledge has 




















“The proactive approach to a mistake is to acknowledge it instantly, correct 









5.1. INTRODUCTION  
Media access control (MAC) protocols play a huge role in the energy-efficiency of wireless 
sensor networks (WSN) especially as these networks have resource-constrained devices 
which are mostly battery powered. The radio is the major source of energy consumption in 
these devices and access to radio is controlled by the MAC layer. Hence, the MAC protocols 
use duty cycling as one of the ways for saving energy by making nodes go to sleep when 
they are idle and having them only wake up when they need to transmit or receive data. 
While duty cycling can save energy, it can also negatively affect throughput. This gives rise 
to the need to experimentally observe the effects of duty cycling on energy consumption 
and throughput in different MAC protocols to understand which other variables, beyond the 
duty cycles, could help to improve the energy-efficiency balance. 
Understanding the various sources of energy loss such as collision, overhearing, idle 
listening, and control overhead is important as this would help give insight into what 
techniques other than duty cycling can help save energy. 
Energy loss can be random or can be caused by an intentional attack, one of which is called 
a denial-of-sleep (DoS) attack [97], [98], [99], [115]. Various methods are used to carry out a 
DoS attack. These are commonly classified as sleep deprivation, barrage, synchronization, 
replay, collision and broadcast attacks [100]. These attacks take advantage of vulnerabilities 
such as frame collisions, message overhearing and idle listening [101]. On the other hand, 
various approaches have been proposed to detect and prevent DoS attacks. Existing 
comparisons of these approaches are qualitative in nature with a focus on their strengths 
and weaknesses [100].  
It is pertinent to note that in the context of DoS, a number of approaches exist to curb these 
attacks, however the majority of them are techniques that do not take energy-efficiency 
into consideration and even when they do, throughput becomes a trade-off which could 
become counter-productive in the long run. The most notable existing approaches include 
Gateway-MAC (GMAC) [105], Hash-based scheme [106], Clustered adaptive rate limiting 
[99], Fake schedule switch scheme [107], Absorbing Markov chain (AMC) model [108], 
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Secure wakeup scheme [109], Zero knowledge protocol [110] and Cross layer mechanism 
[111]. 
The aim of this research therefore is to analyse the effects of duty cycling on energy 
efficiency and throughput in three MAC protocols and analyse the results to find clues as to 
how to create “proactive energy efficiency” – energy conservation that still supports 
throughput while minimising the impact of DoS attacks. Thus, a simulation experiment is 
carried out based on three duty-cycled protocols to monitor their effect on energy 
consumption as well as their effect on throughput. The analysis of the experimental results 
is then followed by a recommendation of a model for building an improved proactive 
energy-efficient protocol. The chapter concludes with plans for future work. 
METHODOLOGY 
A. Existing duty-cycle protocols 
Duty cycling involves a cycle of an active period and a sleep period. However, these 
schedules need to be synchronised in some way to allow for harmony rather than counter-
productivity. Hence, the need to consider several categories of MAC layer protocols [102] as 
listed below: 
- Static scheduled protocols (SMAC); 
- Adaptive group schedule (TMAC); 
- Adaptive repeated schedule (SCP-MAC); 
- Adaptive staggered schedule (DMAC); 
- Adaptive reservation schedule (RMAC). 
B. Simulation 
The simulation was carried out using OMNET++ and Castalia framework [113]. It involves 
experiments with SMAC and TMAC which are the most popular among the duty-cycled 
protocols as well as the TunableMAC protocol, discussed later in Section III. Measurements 
were performed under different network sizes while observing the energy consumption and 
reception.  
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Our simulation experiments are based on a bridge test application whereby the structural 
health of a bridge is monitored, a 40-metre bridge with 7 nodes and a 200-metre bridge 
with 34 nodes as well as 1000-metre bridge with 154 nodes. Each node is arranged in the 
form of a grid is 20 metres apart from the next node, hence this explains the number of 
nodes which correspond to the length of the bridge. A sample interval of 1000ms is used, 
while the consumed energy is measured in megawatts. To reduce randomness in the 
results, a random seed value has been used and set to 10 which indicates the number of 
repetitions of the simulation. The value 10 was determined by using a 95% confidence 
interval along with manually checking the smoothness and precision of the results by trying 
out different seed values and observing the results.  
5.2. Algorithms 
A. SMAC (Static-Scheduled) 
The SMAC protocol [112] has a static schedule which is fixed during network setup. This 
means that nodes have a fixed duty cycle (durations for sleep and listen are fixed). The 
implications of this is that in low traffic, energy may be wasted during the fixed listen 
durations whereby nodes will stay awake unnecessarily for the sake of completing the 
schedule, instead of sleeping.  
Algorithm for SMAC 
• Node listens to medium for a certain period by performing Carrier sense (CS). 
• If node receives schedule from neighbour, it chooses it and becomes a follower. 
• The node broadcasts its new schedule after a random delay. 
• Else, the node determines its own schedule and broadcasts it to neighbours. 
• Node sends message using Request-to-send (RTS) by randomly selecting a time slot. 
• If a node hears an RTS or Clear-to-send (CTS) message, it goes to sleep. 
B. TMAC (Adaptive Grouped Schedule) 
Unlike SMAC where the duty cycle is fixed, the TMAC allows for flexibility during a node’s 
listen time according to the traffic density. The minimum time for which a node stays awake 
before going to sleep is the adaptive timeout (TA). Other packets used by TMAC include 
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Data-send (DS) which is a dummy message sent when a node wants to transmit at the same 
time it hears a future RTS packet. This helps prevent collision by delaying transmission. 
Algorithm for TMAC 
• Nodes wake up at the beginning of the slot. 
• Node sleeps if no activity is observed. 
• If a node overhears a CTS, it stays awake till the end of the transmission. 
• At the end of the transmission, the node contends for the medium again and begins 
transmission if it wins the medium. 
• If a node has pending data, it informs its intended receiver using a future RTS 
technique to avoid the early-sleeping problem. 
• The receiver remains active until the message is received. 
• If another node is about to transmit and overhears a future RTS packet, it sends DS 
to its receiver to delay transmission. 
C. SCP-MAC (Adaptive Repeated Schedule) 
This protocol improves the grouped schedule protocols by eliminating the early sleep 
problem by creating repeated small active periods in one slot. 
Algorithm for SCP-MAC 
• Nodes perform CS by randomly selecting a slot within the first contention window. 
• If channel is idle sender transmits a short wake-up tone timed to intersect with the 
receiver’s channel polling. 
• After waking up the receiver, the sender transmits the data packet. 
• Else node aborts transmission until next frame. 
D. DMAC (Adaptive Staggered Schedule) 
This works very well with the tree-based topology in such a way that the schedule of one 
node is synchronised with the schedule of the next hop node. 
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Algorithm for DMAC 
• Node sends a packet to the next hop node on the route. 
• The node awaits acknowledgment and the next hop node enters receiving state at 
the same time. 
• If this next hop node is not the destination node, the node enters sending state to 
forward the packet. 
• Else the final destination has been reached. 
• If sender does not receive ACK, it queues the message until the next sending.  
• If node has multiple packets to send, it increases its duty cycle and requests other 
nodes along the sink route to increase their duty cycles too. 
E. RMAC (Adaptive Reservation) 
This protocol allows nodes to negotiate their schedules. 
Algorithm for RMAC 
• During the Synchronisation (SYNC) phase, nodes synchronise their clocks. 
• During the data phase, the sender waits for a randomly chosen time plus an 
additional DCF Inter-frame Space (DIFS) period. 
• If no activity is detected, the sender transmits a Pioneer Control Frame (PION). 
• The next hop node along the route looks up the next hop and forwards the PION to it 
after waiting for a Shortest Inter-frame space (SIFS) period. 
• The process continues until destination is reached. 
• Data transmission begins during sleep period. 
• Each node returns acknowledgement (ACK) after receiving packet and returns to 
sleep mode. 
• Process continues until data is received at destination. 
F. TunableMAC 
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TunableMAC is a protocol that was provided along with the WSN Framework, Castalia [17].  
Algorithm for TunableMAC 
As the name implies, this algorithm is tuneable and allows 12 of its parameters to be tuned. 
This protocol can simulate many duty-cycling protocols, but it does not support unicast. It 
uses Carrier-sense multiple access (CSMA) for its transmission, therefore its persistence and 
backing off policies can be tuned. Its duty cycle can also be tuned as well as the train of 
beacons that can be used to wake up potential receivers.  
 
5.3. Simulation Results 
A. Energy Simulation 
This section presents experimental results for energy consumption. This is done first for the 
TunableMAC and secondly, the three protocols (SMAC, TMAC and TunableMAC) are 
compared in terms of their energy consumption. 
 
Figure 49: Energy Consumption for TunableMAC at varied duty cycles and bridge sizes 
 
Figure 49 shows that the energy consumption increases in direct proportion to the duty 
cycle. The energy consumption is highest in the 200-metre bridge when the duty cycle is 0.3. 
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Figure 50: Energy Consumption for TunableMAC, SMAC and TMAC at varied bridge sizes 
In Figure 50, SMAC appears more stable than TMAC and TunableMAC in terms of energy 
consumption. TunableMAC consumes the highest energy, followed by SMAC and then 
TMAC which consumes the least energy. 
B. Reception Simulation 
The reception simulation shows the ratio of the number of packets received at the sink to 
the total number of packets transmitted. Each packet has a maximum size of 128 bytes. The 
payload hasn’t been considered as part of the scope of this project and therefore hasn’t 
been investigated in terms of energy consumption. This could be considered as part of 
future research. 
 
Figure 51: Reception ratio  for TunableMAC at varied duty cycles and bridge sizes 
Figure 51 shows that there is a higher reception in the 40-metre bridge with the 200m and 
1000m competing for a lower reception.  
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Figure 52: Total packet  for TunableMAC at varied bridge sizes 
In Figure 52, more packets are sent in the 40m bridge and this is followed closely by the 
200m bridge and then the 1000m bridge takes the last position with relatively low number 
of packets transmitted. 
 
Figure 53: Reception ratio for TunableMAC, SMAC and TMAC at varied bridge sizes 
In Figure 53, TMAC and SMAC have similar reception ratios while TunableMAC has a lower 
reception ratio. 
 
Figure 54: Total packets for TunableMAC, SMAC and TMAC at varied bridge sizes 
In Figure 54, TunableMAC has the highest number of packets followed by SMAC and TMAC. 
8.5. ANALYSIS 
Figure 49 shows the changes in TunableMAC energy consumption as the duty cycles change. 
Energy is most consumed in the 40m bridge in total but at duty cycle 0.3, the 200m bridge 
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consumes the highest energy. Energy consumption increases proportionally to the duty 
cycle. Figure 50 compares SMAC, TMAC and TunableMAC and of all the three TunableMAC 
consumes the most energy. Figure 51 shows that reception is highest in a 40m bridge 
because of the distance. In Figure 52, throughput is highest in the 40m bridge although the 
200m bridge seems to take over as duty cycle approaches 0.3. In Figure 53, SMAC and TMAC 
have a better reception ratio than TunableMAC, however in Figure 54, throughput is highest 
in TunableMAC. TunableMAC appears to spend a lot of energy without much productivity. 
On the other hand, TMAC and SMAC save more energy but transmit a very small number of 
packets. 
Based on the above results and analysis, the following issues were identified: 
• Too much energy consumption with less productivity. This is evident in the 
TunableMAC protocol which relatively consumes a lot of energy as shown in Figure 
40 but has a relatively low reception ratio. 
• Low energy consumption with little or no adaptability to a topological change. 
In response to these issues, we propose a novel model based on the virtual clusters 
approach that is secure and proactively energy-efficient. 
 
Figure 55: Conceptual model of components of proposed proactive energy-efficient MAC protocol 
The proposed model is based on information gathered from the aforementioned literature. 
To solve the problem of little or no adaptability to topological changes, virtual clustering, 
cluster head rotation and adaptive duty cycling are proposed as part of the model. The use 
of virtual rather than real clusters [114] is better in the sense that it is adaptable to any 
change in topology. Also, there’ll also be rotation of cluster heads depending on their 
availability and resource consumption. Secondly, an adaptive duty cycling would then be 
incorporated into the virtual clusters. One benefit of adaptive duty cycling in relation to the 
issues identified is that it can solve the problem of too much energy consumption with low 
Virtual Clustering 
Adaptive duty-cycling 





reception ratio by allowing the nodes sleep for longer when there is less traffic and also stay 
awake when the traffic is high. Hence, the duty cycle won’t be fixed but adaptive based on 
traffic. To further improve energy-efficiency, a measurement-based security technique such 
as RSSI[141] can then be introduced to protect against any form of jamming. The presence 
of virtual clusters also be utilised to only allow cluster-level broadcasts rather than network-
wide broadcasts. 
5.4. Future work 
In the future, the RSSI values would be used as a parameter in detecting denial-of-sleep 
attacks. This would be achieved via the following steps: 
A. Use RSSI to measure distance between nodes 
The RSSI parameter can be used to tell the distance between nodes and this can be useful 
in knowing how far a node is from the sink. 
B. Use the distance measurements to assign nodes to real clusters  
    Knowing the distance between nodes can also enable clustering to be done among nodes. 
This would allow creation of real clusters and allows for nodes closest to each other to be in 
the same cluster 
C. Establish a threshold value for the RSSI and go into deep sleep when there is an anomaly 
    Studying the RSSI values can also help detect a malicious node by observing an abnormal 
pattern in the RSSI values which would detectable if there is a threshold value.  
Furthermore, investigation can be done to ascertain why TunableMAC performs better 
than SMAC and TMAC in terms of packet reception at the sink. More research can be done in 
the TunableMAC protocol to find out what other parameters influence its high performance 
for the majority of the results. The TunableMAC is a good protocol to investigate especially 
because of its tuneable parameters which allows for a lot of experimenting to see the effect 
of certain changes. The throughput and latency aspects of the protocols can also be analysed 
to observe the relationship these parameters. Finally, this can lead to the development of an 
improved secure and energy-efficient WSN MAC protocol. 
 
One of the areas for future work is to investigate how machine learning techniques can be 
applied to data collected by the sensor nodes. The algorithms will be run on the machine 
connected to the base station and then the output from the learning is then passed across to 
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the nodes as an update. Furthermore, a wireless sensor network based on raspberry PIs could 
be used in place of the Sun SPOT devices in order to keep up with the most recent trends in 
the field. 
In the future, it could be useful to look into how to adapt TunableMAC by extending the 
concepts presented in Section VI and Figure 7. An impact analysis will be done on the other 
higher layers to analyse the overall energy-efficiency and throughput caused by changes to 
the MAC layer. 
Alternative network architectures should be considered as an area for further research as 
more application areas of wireless sensor networks require topological changes to meet 
their goals. More complex alternative topologies such as mesh and hybrid topologies could 
be considered within the same context of energy efficiency and throughput. Mobility of 
sensors within the network is also another area that should be considered in order to cater 
for the variety of application domains that exist. It’s pertinent to note that Castalia 
simulator provides support for the mobility of sensors and therefore could still be used for 
research around mobility of wireless sensor networks. Another area for future consideration 
is payload analysis as this has significant impact on latency, throughput and energy-
efficiency of the WSN. Another area that could be looked into for mitigating denial-of-sleep 
attacks is machine learning. Algorithms like Bayes theorem could be explored to help 
calculate the probability of a denial-of-sleep attack based on measurement of certain 
metrics on the network. However, careful consideration should be given to ensure that 
more energy is not lost from introducing machine learning, than in mitigating the attacks. 
 
The next phase would be to introduce the use of an Arduino board or a Raspberry pie to 
implement these sensors physically and go beyond the simulated environment to further 
demonstrate the proposed prototype. But before this is finalised the MAC protocol will need 
to have been developed fully on the simulator with the security features. It is important to 
bear in mind that the current prototype mostly handles energy efficiency and does not fully 
include security features. The security aspects would focus on the availability aspect of the 
CIA as this overlaps with energy-efficiency. 
One of the future plans for the project is Machine learning and Data analytics. The current 
research uses a simulation approach whereby some tuning is done using the TunableMAC 
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protocol to save energy as well as wireless signal parameters such as RSSI and LQI to detect 
denial-of-sleep attacks. Although this is a great solution, the effectiveness of this protocol 
may reduce as the network size increases. For wireless sensor networks of thousands of 
nodes, a need arises for a much more autonomous solution for which machine learning can 
play a huge role. This properly fits with the original intended GAS (Green Autonomous 
Security) model discussed in chapter 3. 
There has been research in the three aspects (Energy efficiency, autonomy and access 
control) and even research on the balance between energy efficiency and security but little 
or no research has been done on the trade-off between energy efficiency, autonomy and 
access control. 
The expectation from research is that a technique be discovered that intelligently or 
autonomously achieves effective access control in an energy –efficient manner. While the 
research may seem broad in terms of cutting across three research areas, the narrowness lies 

























Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
 

















This chapter aims to discuss how much of the intended objectives have been achieved, as 
well as the contributions to knowledge and strengths of the project. Further reflection is 
done on the challenges encountered during the project alongside the lessons learned from 
the project.  
 
It’s important to note that all seven objectives of the project were achieved although with 
some areas of improvement for future considerations. One of the objectives was to enhance 
the energy-efficiency of wireless sensor networks via the MAC layer and this was achieved. 
Another achieved objective was to minimize the impact of a denial-of-sleep attack and 
lastly, the objective of developing a MAC layer-based energy-efficient and secure prototype 
called LayeredMAC. The prototype was tested for its energy-efficiency and throughput 
under a denial-of-sleep attack in comparison with two other protocols.  
 
By carrying out simulation experiments which involved comparing the effect of duty cycling 
on the energy consumption using SMAC and TMAC protocols, it was then possible to 
enhance energy efficiency by tuning certain parameters such as duty cycle, listen interval, 
transmit power and sample interval, all with the help of the TunableMAC protocol. By using 
the layered model which included virtual clustering, adaptive duty cycling, RSSI/LQI 
measurements and cluster head rotations, the objective of minimising the impact of a 
denial-of-sleep attack was achieved. The last objective was achieved by developing the MAC 
layer prototype called LayeredMAC which was then tested against SMAC and TMAC.  
 
One of the main contributions to knowledge was the framework developed as part of the 
novel MAC layer prototype. The framework served as a basis for the development of 
algorithms to improve on the energy-efficiency of the wireless sensors by incorporating a 
layered model which applies virtual clustering, RSSI/LQI measurements, adaptive duty 
cycling and cluster head rotation. Another contribution to knowledge is the development of 
the novel MAC protocol which was based on the algorithms. The algorithms and the 
protocol were implemented on OMNET++ simulator, on top of the Castalia framework for 
WSNs. Aspects of the algorithm tested include the energy efficiency and throughput. The 
protocol was tested against other existing MAC layer protocols (SMAC and TMAC). The 
results showed the new MAC protocol showed about twice as much reception at the sink 
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node than the two existing protocols with the same amount of energy. The algorithm was 
also tested under denial-of-sleep attacks in comparison with other protocols and showed 
the same level of energy-efficiency. 
 
One of the strengths of this research is that it shows the effect of duty cycling in MAC 
protocols and their effect on energy consumption. The interesting part is in the 
TunableMAC protocol which allows tuning of the duty cycle to see the energy levels.  
While it is obvious that energy consumption is reduced with lower duty cycles, it is also 
important to know the cost involved in saving energy with regards to throughput and 
latency. This raised the question as to what degree of throughput is being traded to save 
energy. One way to answer this question was to measure the report reception (throughput) 
in the simulator. The results reveal that although SMAC and TMAC perform better than 
TunableMAC in terms of energy consumption, TunableMAC outshines them in terms of 
packet reception (throughput). 
Another strength of the project is the GAS model proposed as a theoretical representation 
of how to understand and tackle denial-of-sleep attacks. Consisting of three aspects- Green 
(Energy-efficiency), Autonomy and Security, this model formed the basis for the simulation 
experiments and developed algorithms that led to the main contribution to knowledge. 
 
Although the objectives were achieved, some areas of improvement were present. One area 
of improvement is in the testing of the new prototype. Although detailed tests were done 
on energy-efficiency and throughput as well as testing under denial-of-sleep attack, more 
tests could have been done to look into the effect of parameters such as the sample interval 
as this was part of the parameters used in the simulation scenario. Although tests were 
carried out under simulated denial-of-sleep attacks, it would have been good to see the 
impact of these attacks on different topologies with mobility of sensors as a factor.  
 
There were many challenges encountered during the project, most of which had to do with 
the simulation environment. There was a steep learning curve with regards to the OMNET++ 
platform in terms of its installation and configuration. The same applied to Castalia 
simulator for wireless sensor networks which had to be installed on OMNET++ simulator. 
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There was no graphical user interface for Castalia simulator, hence commands had to be 
used on a Linux platform to operate the simulator which had to be learned from studying 
the only manual available for the tool. The graphical results produced from the simulator 
where not aesthetically pleasing, hence the values had to be transferred to Microsoft Excel 
and replotted all over again. Only a few existing models of MAC protocols such as TMAC and 
SMAC were available on the simulator. There was also very limited support on the use of 
the simulator, although the availability of a good number of simulation scenarios as well as 
its unique design specifically for wireless sensor networks made it worth considering. 
Another challenge is that Castalia had a limitation of not being platform-specific, hence it 
was a generic framework for the first order validation of an algorithm. Therefore, whatever 
code was written could not be directly implemented on a real sensor without substantial 
modifications. Although the objectives of the project were clear, a multi-disciplinary 
approach was considered in order to achieve the objectives and this posed the challenge of 
striking a balance between exploring different disciplines while keeping focus on the 
objective. The Sun SPOT sensors used for the real-device tests were relatively old and no 
support is currently being provided for them. However, they were chosen because they are 
based on Java and it was quicker to implement the algorithms developed on the simulator 
as Java was my area of expertise. The challenge with these devices was that they only 
worked with Windows XP and there was no support for new operating systems like 
Windows 10. One alternative would have been to use an Arduino board as a platform. 
 
One of the initial challenges faced at the start of the project was how to narrow the research 
to become more specific than just the security of the internet-of-things. The literature study 
began with looking in the internet-of-things and its architecture. After much consideration, 
the research was then narrowed down to one of the components of the internet-of-things - 
Wireless sensor networks. Before narrowing down to wireless sensor networks, some 
literature review was done on current security techniques in general. The solutions were not 
suitable for wireless sensor networks as these networks usually contained resource-
constrained sensors which require different security measures. In relation to IEEE, this meant 
moving from IEEE 802.11 to IEEE 802.15.4. The security solutions included models, 
techniques, frameworks and protocols. Each of these models tackled one of the following 
aspects of security (Confidentiality, integrity and Availability). Although security was the initial 
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focus, consideration had to be given to energy-efficiency as this played a huge role especially 
with the resource-constrained devices. Availability had more priority than confidentiality and 
integrity. The next step was then to rank the security solutions based on different criteria 
using a weighted scoring model. 
Deciding on the project scope was also challenging especially in the aspects of whether to 
combine energy efficiency and information security or just pick one of them. To curb this 
challenge, the solution was to find a common ground between the two, where they overlap 
and then gradually expand from there. 
One of the next strategies used was to decide on which simulator to use. Several simulators 
were considered before arriving at the final choice. Among the many simulators considered 
were OMNET++, JSim, OPNET(RiverBed), Mathlab etc. Making a choice of simulator depended 
mainly on two aspects: skill level and relevance to research as discussed in chapter 3. 
OMNET++ was the chosen simulator mainly because of its support for the Castalia framework 
which was specifically designed for wireless sensor networks. Installing the simulator was 
challenging at first mostly because it was command-line based. Installation of the software 
was also a big challenge as the simulator wasn’t fully compatible with the windows platform 
and did not work properly. After uncountable attempts, the solution was then to install 
Ubuntu OS on the Oracle VirtualBox which sits on a windows platform. 
Scoping the literature review was also a challenge as there was an enormous amount of 
information surrounding energy efficiency and security of wireless sensor networks. The 
literature review surrounded areas such as the internet of things and its applications, wireless 
sensor networks architecture, design, energy efficiency and security.  
Another major challenge was in the evaluation of MAC protocols. Most of the information 
about existing protocol were mainly theoretical and even the ones that were simulated didn’t 
provide any of the files, and even if they did, it wouldn’t be compatible with the simulator for 
this project (OMNET++). Hence, the plan was to develop models of this existing protocols 
afresh using the OMNET++ simulator but that seemed very painstaking and was therefore 
brushed aside. Although the OMNET++ simulator came with some pre-loaded existing MAC 
protocol models such as SMAC and TMAC but these were not exhaustive. However, a Tunable 
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MAC which was also part of the framework (Castalia) on OMNET++ allowed one to customise 
different parameters in a way that could represent several existing MAC Protocols. 
Comparing various security approaches and protocols was a bit challenging for a number of 
reasons. One of the reasons was that some of them were full protocols while some were just 
techniques, some of which had not been tested. Furthermore, some of the protocols didn’t 
have enough information about them in their journals to actually get enough information. 
Considering that the bigger goal of this project would be to create a prototype MAC layer 
protocol which is energy-efficiency and secure, there was therefore a great need to find a gap 
in existing MAC layer protocols as well as existing security approaches and see how that gap 
can be filled through this research output. 
The need to learn C++ programming language as well as NED language was paramount 
because the OMNET++ simulator was based on these languages. NED which stands for 
network definition was required to define the network topology why C++ handled the 
dynamic aspects of the network such as communication. Learning these languages and 
applying them to the current scenario was quite painstaking and kind of caused slight delays. 
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Title of Proposed Investigation 
Energy-efficient and autonomous access control on the Internet of Things 
Research Objectives 
To review access control attacks and vulnerabilities on different IoT application domains 
To investigate autonomous computing and its implication to the IoT context 
To develop a methodology that combines energy efficiency, autonomy and access control in 
a coherent way. 
To develop an autonomous approach to achieve access control on the IoT 
To experiment iteratively on the above approach in order to improve its energy efficiency 
To critically discuss the development process and analyse the results 
To build a prototype based on the results of the experiment 
To test the prototype based on a 3 major test cases 
To critically evaluate each step of the entire process and reach concrete conclusions 
Research Questions 
How can autonomy be used to enhance access control on the IoT?  
How can an energy-efficiency be applied to an autonomic access control approach on the 
IoT? 
Contribution to Knowledge 
The core parts of this research are Energy-efficiency and Autonomous security. With the 
increasing need for security, there is plenty of focus on security improvement but this 
research draws attention to the resource-constrained nature of the devices on the IoT and 
therefore will bring security improvement that is energy-efficient. Furthermore, applying 
autonomy through artificial intelligence techniques to enhance security is another area 
currently being researched and is being driven by the fact that an exponential increase in 
the number of devices on the IoT is at hand and the complexity that comes with it can best 
be managed through autonomy.  
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This research contributes uniquely by combining energy-efficiency with autonomy in way 
that achieves a green security. 
Another aspect that may likely have some potential contribution is access control, more 
specifically authentication. While much of the authentication techniques focus on human-
to-machine interaction, the IoT consists of machine-to-machine or thing-to-thing 
communication which also requires authentication. This research is intended to lay more 









Figure 52: Research Contribution- A Green approach towards Autonomous Security 
Literature Review (State-of-the-art) 
Energy-related IoT issues and solutions 
ICT accounts for about 2.5 percent of all harmful emissions with regards to global carbon 
emissions. Two aspects are highlighted that contribute to energy saving: Reliability and 
Efficiency [1]. From a CIA perspective, while efficiency has to do availability, reliability has to 
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IoT Communication is identified as one of the areas that dominates energy consumption 
and efficiency can be enhanced by reducing transmission power to the barest minimum, 
applying the right algorithms to design communication protocols and activity scheduling [2]. 
Prasad and Kumar[1] also suggest that redundancy technologies could be very helpful in 
handling reliability issues which could be present not only during transmission, as in the 
case of efficiency, but also during sensing and processing by IoT sensor nodes. 
Asides reliability and efficiency, security is another variable that has to be considered when 
making a trade-off as an energy-efficient and reliable IoT would not be termed as successful 
if there is no security[3].   
Energy-related security solutions 
 
Figure 53: Security Mechanisms for M2M communication [8] 
The above figure shows two mechanisms: Early detecting node compromise with couple and 
bandwidth cooperative authentication to filter false data.  
The first mechanism works by coupling nodes together either in Husband(H) and Wife (W) 
mode or husband (H)-Wife(W)-Child(C) mode and having them exchange beacon messages 
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that could help them detect a compromise on one of the nodes[3]. While this enhances 
security, more energy is being utilized. The case could also be vice versa, where energy-
efficiency is enhanced and security becomes compromised like in the case where a node is 
compromised by an attacker without being detected because the node has been put in 
sleep mode to save energy. 
The second mechanism is a bandwidth co-operative authentication that involves a collective 
authentication by a number of nodes is proven to be very effective[4], however, on the 
condition that the transmission radius is well chosen as the en route filtering probability 
reduces as transmission radius increases[3]. 
Tourancheau et al[5] conclude based on their experiments that the energy cost is relatively 
low for sensor devices in a wireless sensor network although this is restricted to IEEE 
802.15.4 security features and does not take other aspects of security into consideration. 
The question then lies in how a balance can be ensured between efficiency, reliability and 
security. 
Access control 
Autonomous Access control 
One of the challenges identified for self-configurable IoT systems is energy awareness. 
Considering the envisioned scale of IoT growth of about 20 billion devices in 2020[6], it is 
worthwhile to consider energy as a constraint when building self-configurable systems as 
this could be help improve the life-span of sensor devices as well as provide more support 
for critical applications[7]. Other challenges identified include development of suitable 
metrics, coordinated contextual intelligence, resilience to failures, outrages and attacks, 
application integration and incentives for self-management. 
In [8], an identity authentication and capability-based access control model (IACAC) is 
proposed and is said to protect against man-in-the-middle, replay and denial of service 
attacks. Certain criteria are considered to be very important in the context of the IoT when 
developing authentication and access control models. These include mutual authentication, 
lightweight solution, attack resistance (Denial of service, Man in the middles, Replay 
attacks), Distributed nature and access control. The IACAC model achieves all of the 
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aforementioned criteria except the lightweight criteria which is synonymous with energy 
efficiency. 
Device based authentication  
The IBM Zone Trusted Information Channel (ZTIC)[9] is a specialised hardware device 
intended to protect against certain man-in-the-middle attacks through malicious software  
that cannot be prevented by two-factor authentication approach. 
 
Figure 54: ZTIC Architecture[9] 
The above figure shows how the ZTIC technology works by creating a secure connection to 
the bank server through a proxy on the USB device. This means that all communication 
between the ZTIC proxy and the server is outside of the client PC and is protected via end-
to-end TLS connection. 
Quantum-cryptography based authentication 
Based on quantum cryptography, a quantum-secure authentication is proposed in [10] as 
having the following characteristics: 
A key that cannot be physically emulated 
Secure against digital emulation attacks 
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Is not dependent on secret data 
Is not dependent on unproven mathematical assumptions 
Its implementation is straightforward 
The benefit of quantum cryptography is that, unlike digital keys where their theft can go 
undetected, a physical object (physical unclonable function) which is based on quantum-
physical principles makes it impossible for an attacker to typify the incident light pulse 
which in turn prevents the attacker from being able to mimic the expected optical response. 
Authorization 
In [11], an OAUth-based authorization service (OAS) architecture, which is targeted at 
machine-to-machine applications (IoT), is proposed. The open-authorization is beneficial in 
that it is third-party in nature; hence reducing the load on the resource-constrained devices 
on the IoT, allowing for scalability and remote customization of access policies. 
However, one of the setbacks of the OAS architecture is that its energy consumption is on 
the high side particularly due to the radio transmission. 
On the other hand, in [12], a secure and efficient authentication and authorization 
architecture is proposed which reduces communication overhead by 26% and 
communication latency by 16% by using a smart gateway to ensure a distributed form of 
authentication and authorization based on the certificate-based DTLS handshake protocol. 
Smart Object Lifecycle-based access control 
It is important to consider security in the context of the smart “thing” and ensure that 
security is addressed at each phase of the lifecycle from when power is first introduced to 
when the device is in operation, thereby making security fundamental to the device’s 
proper functioning rather than just being an add-on[13].  
In [14], certain attacks are classified based on what phase of the lifecycle they happen. At 
the initial stage, a compromise of root of trust can occur as well as modification of 
credentials and keys at the manufacturing phase. At the deployment phase, server 
impersonation and denial-of-service attacks could occur while physical capture of devices 
could occur at the operational phase. 
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Threats, Vulnerabilities and Solutions to the IoT from a CIA perspective 
According to E&Y [15], 7 in 10 devices on the IoT are vulnerable. They emphasize on the 
idea that the cyber threat to the IoT should not be seen just as a technological issue but as a 
business-wide issue. Hence, the figure below illustrates the 8 facets which constitute the 
entire risk landscape with regards to cyber threat on the IoT. 
Figure 55: Risk Landscape for IoT [1] 
Information security can practically not be discussed without putting the CIA 
(confidentiality, security and availability into perspective). The literature is discussed with a 
risk assessment approach in mind which is quantitatively calculated by multiplying the 
threats, vulnerabilities and assets.  
Thus, in carrying out a proper risk assessment, one needs to understand not only the threats 
and vulnerabilities involved but also the assets being compromised, with information being 
the asset in this context. 
Kumar and Lee [16] discuss possible threats to the IoT with specific considerations to the 
healthcare application domain. Although the threats are discussed in a healthcare domain 
context, these threats can still be applied to other domains as pointed out by other 
researchers [17]. A number of threats have been identified as follows: 
Monitoring and Eavesdropping 
Kumar and Lee [16]describe this as the most common threat to patient privacy. From a CIA 
context, this breaches the confidentiality of information. Alsaadi and Tubaishat[18] make a 
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distinction between data ownership and data control/access illustrating that the owner of 
the data may not necessarily be the only one with access to the information using Google as 
an example who may use another individual's data for their predictive analysis in the case of 
Google Trends; which poses a huge challenge. 
Denial-of-Service attacks 
Roman et al. [19]; Alsaadi and Tubaishat [18] discuss on denial-of-service attacks with more 
emphasis on distributed-DOS attacks perpetrated through the use of botnets. With regards 
to the CIA, this mainly affects the availability of information. 
IoT architectures and their security implications 
There are different IoT architectures and the architecture adopted determines the kind of 
security vulnerabilities that could be exploited which in turn determines what kind of 
solutions that should be in place. 
It is also important to look at access control in the context of the cloud as the centralized IoT 
architectures include the cloud. Security as a Service (SecaaS) is a relatively new approach 
which stems from the need to outsource security services as well as the need for Managed 
Security Service providers to have a centralized security service from the cloud[20] 
Methodology 
The end goal of this research is to arrive at an energy-efficient approach to ensuring 
autonomous access control on the IoT. The methodology would generally revolve around 
identifying an IoT application domain, a systematic review existing domain specific 
techniques/approaches, a hypothetical design of an approach, an implementation of the 
approach in the chosen domain, a testing of the hypothetical design in certain energy 
contexts against the existing approaches and a critical review of the results and the process. 
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 Figure 56: Conceptual Methodology of proposed research 
Security 
The first step involves the security aspects with focus on access control. Among the many 
access control attacks, one will be chosen as a point of focus for this research. Before 
making a choice, many access control attacks will be reviewed based on certain criteria. 
Since every attack exploits a vulnerability, the next task would be to identify the possible 
vulnerabilities that could give room to that attack and then analyse the possible solutions in 
terms of their energy efficiency. 
The deliverable from this step could be published as a review of access control attacks, 
vulnerabilities and the energy efficiency of these solutions on the IoT. 
Autonomy 
The second step involves suggesting an intelligent or autonomous approach other than the 
possible solutions identified in the first step. The idea behind the intelligent approach is 
based on the anticipated expansion of the IoT in the nearest future and considering the 
level of interaction not just between human and machine but machine and machine, there 
has to be some form of autonomy in the way communication is made (in this case access 
control). The suggested intelligent approach will then have to be tested on a real network. 
Internet of Things (The macro domain) 
Energy Efficiency 
Establish a threshold energy value Compare intelligent approach energy cost 
against threshold value and keep iterating  
Autonomy 
Suggest an intelligent approach Test the approach on a specific domain 
Security 
Select an access control attack Identify the root vulnerability Measure energy cost of 
solution 
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The deliverable from this step could be published as an autonomic approach towards access 
control on the internet of things. 
Energy Efficiency 
The third step which is actually inherent in all steps is the part which forms the critical 
success factor for the project. Based on analysis of existing solutions as well as review of 
secondary data, a particular threshold energy value would have to be reached against which 
the energy consumption of the intended intelligent approach will be compared until the 
threshold is reached or exceeded. Therefore, the second step (intelligent approach) would 
most likely be iterative and experimental in nature pending when the energy threshold 
value is reached. 
Considering that certain energy-related issues are specific to certain contexts[3], it is 
necessary to identify an application domain such as E-healthcare, Smart home, 
environmental monitoring and industrial automation. Choosing a domain would be based 
on certain criteria such as ethical sensitivity, access to resources, level of energy 
consumption and level of need for security. 
To achieve this, a review will need to be done of each domain through a set of qualitative 
methods: 
Risk alternatives for methodology 
In a case, where the aforementioned methods are not feasible, secondary data related to a 
specific application domain will be reviewed as part of the domain identification process.  
Security issues in wireless healthcare applications using wireless sensor networks[16] gives 
specific information about security issues as it relates to healthcare organization with focus 
on specific IoT applications such as MobiCare, UbiMon, AlarmGate, and CodeBlue. 
Information about smart city architecture as well as its security issues are also discussed 
with focus on specific applications such as ETSI M2M and 3GPP LTE-M[21]. 
Information about smart homes with focus on smart metering in a wired smart home 
instance with protocols such as M-bus and xDSL[22].  
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This stage involves reviewing all the possible approaches that can be applicable to the 
domain chosen in phase 1.  
The deliverable from this step would be an energy-efficient autonomous approach to access 





 Figure 57: Time Plan 
The time plan above spans a period of slightly less than 3 years (34 months) beginning from 
24th September 2015 to 31st July, 2018. 
Conclusion 
There has been research in the three aspects (Energy efficiency, autonomy and access 
control) and even research on the balance between energy efficiency and security but little 
or no research has been done on the trade-off between energy efficiency, autonomy and 
access control. 
The expectation from research is that a technique be discovered that intelligently or 
autonomously achieves effective access control in an energy –efficient manner. While the 
research may seem broad in terms of cutting across three research areas, the narrowness 
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